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The recent strengthening of ties between Turkey and Russia even amid high-profile 
diplomatic incidents necessitates a re-evaluation of the United States’ diplomatic approach 
to relations with its NATO ally, Turkey. Analysis of the geopolitical dynamics between 
Turkey and Russia from a realist perspective provides insight into the factors that have 
driven Turkish and Russian actions in the past. However, the development of a more 
predictive model for Turkish and Russian actions requires an understanding of the foreign 
policy worldviews and historical precedents for conflict and cooperation between the two 
nations. Due to their strategic importance for imperial and modern Turkey and Russia, the 
Turkish Straits and Caspian Sea provide valuable insight into this dynamic. By analyzing 
the geopolitical and legal forces that shaped the legal regimes of these waterways, this 
thesis will examine the foreign policy strategies of Turkey and Russia, as well as some of 
the limitations of and alternatives to the realist paradigm of understanding geopolitics. 
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 Between the Russian annexation of Crimea, the downing of a Russian fighter jet by 
Turkish armed forces in late 2015, the assassination of the Russian ambassador to Turkey, 
and the ongoing conflict in Syria, Turkish-Russian relations have gained significant 
importance in the past few years. Representatives of many American think tanks, as well 
as the Congressional Research Service, have analyzed the relations of Turkey and Russia 
from a lens of historical and present geostrategic interests. As members of American 
institutions, many of the scholars analyzing Turkish-Russian relations do so through the 
lenses of noted Western geostrategists or international relations thinkers such as Kissinger, 
Mearsheimer, or Brzezinski. Insofar as think tanks and the CRS serve to influence public 
policy and aid American policymakers in making the best decisions on geostrategy 
according to their own interest, this level of analysis serves its purpose. 
 Yet by using the lenses of Western international relations theory—whether in the 
liberal, realist, or neoconservative tradition—to understand the shifting dynamics in 
Turkish-Russian relations, the policy world risks losing insight into the philosophical 
background of the world leaders responsible for foreign policy decisions in both Turkey 
and Russia. A true understanding of the motivations and underpinnings of foreign 
policymaking in these countries requires an understanding of the works of their prominent 
foreign policy theorists not only as a sui generis product but as a discourse with Western 
intellectual conceptions of international relations. This paper, then, aims to examine the 
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extent to which American theories of foreign policy can adequately explain developments 
in relations between Turkey and Russia, as well as to determine what policymakers can 
learn from examining the way Turks and Russians see themselves in their geopolitical 
environment. 
 In order to accomplish this goal, this thesis will examine the history and current 
status of the waterways disputed and negotiated between Turkey and Russia, as well as the 
current disputes over their legal regimes. For Turkey, Russia, and the US alike, bodies of 
water such as the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, and the Turkish Straits form an integral part 
of geographical identity as well as geopolitics. Turks and Russians have waged historical 
contests to determine whether the Black Sea would be an Ottoman lake or a Russian lake. 
The works of Russian political philosopher Aleksandr Dugin divide the world into the 
people of the land and the people of the sea, declaring the two eternally at war with each 
other.1 Meanwhile, the United States, far removed from both countries and separated by 
two vast oceans, regards a limited presence in the Black Sea as crucial to its interests, in 
keeping with the strategic tradition of offshore balancing. This strategy, while appropriate 
for a distant country such as the United States, has less utility for countries such as Turkey, 
which must develop proactive policy programs such as the current “zero problems with 
neighbors” policy in order to mitigate threats occurring at its borders.2 
                                                 
1 Dugin develops this concept as the conflict between “thalassocracy,” or “power exercised thanks to the 
sea,” which is represented by the United States and Europe, and “tellurocracy,” or “power exercised thanks 
to the land,” which is represented by Eurasia, For more information, see Rénéo Lukic and Michael Brint, 
eds. Culture, politics, and nationalism in the age of globalization, Farnham: Ashgate, 2001, p. 103 
2 This is the critique leveled by Ahmet Davutoglu in Stratejik Derinlik against the application of the 
Western classical realist paradigm, developed by luminaries such as John Mearsheimer, to the foreign 
policy practice of Turkey. 
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 Ahmet Davutoglu defines the Turkish sphere of influence as extending across four 
major world seas: the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the 
Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf may prove a worthy subject of analysis for future studies, 
particularly given Russian support for Iran, American support for Arabian Peninsula states, 
and the ongoing conflict in Syria. However, for the sake both of brevity and regional focus, 
and in keeping with US military focus on the Caucasus and Central Asia as a lynchpin of 
foreign policy strategy, the present analysis will focus more on the first three bodies of 
water. Indeed, this analysis can be consolidated even further, as the geostrategic 
significance of the Black and Eastern Mediterranean Seas to Turkey and Russia hinges on 
control of one geostrategic chokepoint: the Turkish Straits. The literature on the legal 
regimes of the Turkish Straits, the Black Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean all have an 
overwhelming focus on the 1936 Montreux Convention, which accords control of the 
Bosporus and Dardanelles to Turkey and lays the legal framework for states’ passage 
through them in times of peace and war. Given the emphasis, both locally and 
internationally, on this one checkpoint, it makes sense to think of the combined Black and 
Eastern Mediterranean Seas as forming a broader Turkish Straits system. 
Having defined these maritime regions, the first chapter of this thesis analyzes the 
history and current legal regime of the Turkish Straits system, focusing on its status as a 
site of historic confrontation between Turkey and Russia and examining how its legal 
regime affects NATO military and securitization interests. This securitization, as well as 
the circumstances surrounding Turkey’s accession to NATO, underscore the validity of the 
realist lens of international relations in understanding the foreign policy decisions of 
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Turkey, Russia, and the United States. Using this lens, the first chapter concludes that 
Turkey’s protective actions in this region arise from the historical geopolitical competition 
over the Turkish Straits as an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea, together with a realist and 
Ottoman distrust of foreign actors, whether European powers or countries in Turkey’s 
immediate vicinity, such as Russia. This historical experience has influenced the 
development of Turkey’s balanced foreign policy efforts, both with regard to Russia and 
the United States. 
 The second chapter concerns the development of the Caspian Sea’s legal regime, 
particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although Turkey is not a Caspian littoral 
state, its close ethno-linguistic and political ties with Azerbaijan, as well as the realization 
of pipeline projects such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, TANAP, and 
TAP give Turkey a significant stake in the Caspian Sea as a key transit country. By proxy, 
the United States as Turkey’s NATO ally and the European Union as the destination for 
Azerbaijan’s petroleum exports via Turkey both have significant stakes in the development 
of these pipelines. This interest comes to the chagrin of Russia, which views Western 
interests in the Caspian Sea with suspicion and has worked with its fellow littoral states to 
ensure the determination of the Caspian’s legal status as a transnational lake rather than a 
sea subject to international law. The securitization efforts of Caspian littoral states and the 
efforts of NATO countries to influence this securitization also demonstrate the relevance 




 A realist understanding of military capacity and national interests as the primary 
determining factor of foreign policy can help us understand how securitization and the use 
of hard power contribute to the development of Turkish-Russian relations. However, a 
deeper understanding of the soft power exerted by these two countries and potentially 
exerted by the US, EU and NATO requires an understanding of how Turkish and Russian 
leaders and people see themselves and their position in the world, as well as the priorities 
that result from this self-perception. Thus, the final chapter of this thesis will analyze the 
philosophies of identity guiding both Turkish and Russian players in international relations 
and how these philosophies have shaped their views and priorities with regard to foreign 
policy. Using Graham Allison’s model of decision-making to determine the most relevant 
actors in Turkish and Russian foreign policy, this thesis will determine the identitarian and 
foreign policy lenses most relevant to each country and examine the repercussions of each 
for understanding how the United States should conduct its own foreign policy. 
 Ultimately, this thesis concludes that while the realist lens of foreign policy 
provides a suitable means of analysis for the pursuit of US interests in the Black and 
Caspian Seas, as well as the hard power dynamics present between NATO and the CSTO, 
an understanding of identity’s role allows a deeper understanding of potential sites of 
negotiation and cooperation. Such an understanding will provide insight into the potential 
future trajectories of Turkish-Russian relations, which have grown steadily closer since the 
July 15 military coup, and inform the response of the US to this growing rapprochement. 
The Turkish Straits system poses a historical point of anxiety for Turkey due to protracted 
Russian interests in seizing control over the Straits, and the Caspian Sea provides Turkey 
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with an opportunity to develop its status as an energy hub, even at the expense of Russia’s 
gas market, and as a powerful actor in the Turkic world. Thus, this thesis will highlight the 
ideal areas of cooperation with Turkey and Russia to mitigate potential tension with each 




Hegemony, Sovereignty, and the Turkish Straits System’s Legal Regime 
 
 As mentioned in the introduction, the prominent neo-Ottoman foreign policy 
theorist and former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu defines Ottoman 
influence as extending across the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean 
Sea, and the Persian Gulf. This thesis will focus on the first three bodies of water, 
examining the interests and roles of Turkey and Russia in the Caspian Sea in Chapter 2. 
However, this analysis will consolidate two of the Ottoman Empire’s crucial bodies of 
water into one chapter, since the geostrategic importance of both the Black and Eastern 
Mediterranean Seas hinges on one key piece of territory, the Turkish Straits. Although 
ample scholarly analysis exists on Turkey’s role in the Black Sea and the Eastern 
Mediterranean, much of this analysis hinges on three unifying factors: securitization in and 
around the Straits; Russian presence in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean; and 
the 1936 Montreux Convention. In view of these similarities, and for the purposes of 
examining the complex relationship between Turkey and Russia, it makes more sense to 
consolidate analysis of the Black and Eastern Mediterranean Seas into a single Turkish 
Straits system. 
Despite considerable advances in warship technology and changes in international 
maritime law over the past 80 years, Turkey continues to define the legal regime of the 
Turkish Straits primarily in accordance with the Montreux Convention. In the post-Cold 
War era, this regime, supported at least rhetorically by Vladimir Putin, uses Turkish control 
of the Straits to uphold a principle of regional determinism in the Black Sea and the 
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Caucasus, which has disadvantaged NATO’s capacity to project hard power in the region. 
As Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan moves to consolidate power amid European 
consternation, American projection of soft power in Turkey will prove increasingly 
important in maintaining present alliances. This thesis will examine the historical 
conditions leading to the development of the Turkish Straits legal regime in order to assess 
the Straits’ value as a product of—and potential site of diplomatic cooperation in—
international diplomacy. 
Drawing on academic, journalistic, and official governmental sources, I begin with 
an overview of Turkish-Russian competition over the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits, 
starting with the formalization of Turkish-Russian Relations in the late 15th century. I 
continue with an analysis of Great Power interests in maintaining the stability of the Straits 
before finally assessing how Turkey’s diplomatic and military history from the 15th century 
to World War I informed the beginning of the Turkish Straits legal regime’s development 
in 1923. This analysis will also examine how the Ottoman experience informs modern 
Turkey’s decision-making processes regarding the Straits question. I conclude that 
Turkey’s protective actions toward the Straits arise from a long history of territorial 
expansionism, a realistic suspicion of international actors, and an eye toward taking 
advantage of the balance of power to discourage foreign intervention. Subsequently, I 
examine the impact this history has had on American and international interests in the 
Turkish Straits and the potential actions that the current administration and global allies of 
the US could take in order to leverage the issue of the Straits to maintain strong diplomatic 
ties with Turkey. 
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This thesis approaches the historical development of the Turkish Straits legal 
framework from a realist perspective, with the understanding that laws and principles—
especially on the anarchical international level—must be substantiated by enforcement and 
can be undermined by changes in the capacity of any party to enforce relevant statutes. In 
addition, the legal analysis of the Turkish Straits regime before World War I draws not 
only on treaties and agreements, but also on international custom, noting that historically 
these customs have served as precedents for drafting formal legal statutes. Yet the legal 
principle of rebus sic stantibus holds that laws must change along with material facts on 
the ground, rendering the struggle for legal and customary legitimacy subject to the designs 
of more powerful interests. This phenomenon manifests in the competing designs of Great 
Britain and Russia regarding the Straits, as well as the recent ambitions of Bush 
administration officials to revisit the Montreux Convention, or otherwise to create 
precedents for provisions of the convention to be breached in state interests. 
 Throughout history, numerous geopolitical actors have vied for control of the 
Straits, even before the birth of Christ; Ünlü and Rozakis, for instance, posit that the Trojan 
War had control of the Straits as its end goal. However, since this thesis aims to examine 
how history informs present decisions, I have aimed to restrict the analysis to states and 
actors that remain relevant to modern international relations. Great Britain, France, and 
Russia were—and remain—dominant forces in European politics with lasting and 
continued impacts on the Ottoman Empire and contemporary Turkish foreign policy. By 
contrast, Austria-Hungary and Greece, while playing a significant role in the geopolitics of 
Eastern Europe and the Straits Question, have since lost much relevance in modern politics 
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with the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the financial collapse of Greece. While my 
analysis touches on the role of these countries somewhat, the focus remains on significant 
present-day actors in the region. 
 
Imperial Russian Ambitions in the Turkish Straits 
 
 The first period of Turkish Straits history, as defined by Nihan Ünlü, revolved 
around the progressive interstate geopolitical struggle for control of the Turkish Straits, out 
of which the Ottoman Empire emerged as the victor in the 15th century.3 By the time 
Ottoman-Russian relations began in 1492, the Ottoman Empire had wrested control of the 
Straits away from Rome, which in turn had seized the Straits from the Greeks. Indeed, the 
newly developing relationship between Turkey and Russia began as a geopolitical struggle 
over several key geostrategic regions. These regions included the Crimean Khanate, a 
territory which, after a period of control by the Mongol Golden Horde, became an Ottoman 
vassal state in 1475.4 Also among these geostrategic sites of interest, and more germane to 
the present study, were the Black Sea, the Dardanelles, the Bosporus, and the Sea of 
Marmara. 
 The Russo-Ottoman struggle for geopolitical influence in the Black Sea and the 
Turkish Straits took place against a greater backdrop of regional and European territorial 
                                                 
3 Nihan Ünlü, “The Legal Regime of the Turkish Straits,” in International Straits of the World, ed. Gerard 
J. Mangone, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002, p. 7 
4 S.F. Oreshkova and N.Y. Ulchenko, Rossiya i Turtsiya: Problemy Formirovaniya Granits [Russia and 




and religious campaigns. Although European voyages of discovery to the West caused the 
Turkish Straits to lose much of their commercial and geostrategic relevance to European 
powers by the 15th century, the role of the Straits in uniting two waterways—the Black and 
Mediterranean Seas—and in providing routes of communication would continue to make 
the Straits a point of contention across Europe.5 Tsarist Russia in particular had an eye 
toward territorial acquisition in the Turkish Straits and the Black Sea. The ice that formed 
during the winter months rendered the Baltic Sea unnavigable for much of the year; as a 
result, Russia sought access to the Black Sea and the Straits as an alternate sea route to the 
Mediterranean during those months. 
In the late 17th century, the Russo-Turkish War of 1686-1700 led to Peter the 
Great’s capture of nearby Azov and the establishment of a Russian presence in the Crimean 
Peninsula,6 a conquest legally formalized in 1700 by the Treaty of Constantinople.7 
Ottoman control of the Kerch Strait continued to preclude Russian access to the Black Sea; 
however, Catherine the Great managed to obtain access after a series of territorial conflicts 
with the Ottomans between the 17th and 18th centuries.8 The Turkish-Russian War in the 
second half of the 18th century resulted in an Ottoman defeat south of the Danube, leading 
to the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774. This treaty gave Russia merchant 
access to the Turkish Straits; Russia also gained recognition as a Black Sea power 
following its annexation of the Crimean Khanate in 1783. However, Russia continued to 
                                                 
5 Christos Rozakis and Petros Stagos, “The Turkish Straits,” in International Straits of the World, ed. 
Gerard J. Mangone, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, p. 14 
6 Ibid, 17 
7 “Treaty of Constantinople (1700)” in Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical 
Encyclopedia, Vol. 1, ed. Alexander Mikaberidze, 250. 
8 Ünlü, “The Legal Regime of the Turkish Straits,” p. 10 
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seek direct control over the Turkish Straits, and to this end partnered with Austria in another 
campaign against Turkey in 1789, though Austria would withdraw from this campaign in 
1791. Wary of Russian expansionism, Great Britain, Holland, and Prussia intervened to 
repel Russian advances, resulting in the signature of the Treaty of Jassy.9 While this treaty 
confirmed the gains made by Russia in the Crimean Khanate, as well as all the gains 
formalized by the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the coveted Turkish Straits remained under 
Ottoman administration. 
This intervention would not mark the first time—nor the last—that Western 
European powers took interest in guarding Ottoman sovereignty and control of the Straits 
against Russian expansionism. Nearly a century prior, three years after the Russian 
conquest of Azov, both Britain and France supported the Ottoman Empire’s denial of 
Russia’s request to pass warships through the Straits. As a general principle, Britain sought 
to avoid the development of sovereignty in the Aegean and Black Sea regions in order to 
facilitate the navigation of trade routes to India. Thus, in an effort to contain the 
expansionist ambitions of other empires in the region, Britain supported the “sick man of 
Europe” as controller of the Straits over more ambitious countries such as Russia. Austria-
Hungary would assume a similar policy of convenience with the Ottoman Empire due to 
its opposition of a strong Greece, while France had interests in protecting Catholic 
populations within the Empire.10 
                                                 
9 Ibid, 21 
10 Rozakis and Stagos, 18 
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Nor would Russia be the sole aggressor seeking control of the Turkish Straits as 
Europe entered the 19th century. Despite the experience of Russian aggression only a 
quarter of a century prior, the Sultan and the Tsar signed an agreement formed in 1798 and 
renewed in 1805 which allowed Russian warships to pass through the Straits and 
established the Ottoman Empire’s responsibility for passage by both Russia and other 
international powers. The Sultan concluded this agreement largely due to fear of aggression 
from Napoleonic France to the west, which at the time had designs to conquer Egypt, a 
plan foiled by the joint intervention of Britain and Turkey. Napoleon himself likewise 
recognized the geopolitical value of keeping the Straits under Turkish control, as he, like 
Britain, feared that Russian control of the area could facilitate Tsarist expansionism.11 To 
that end, despite having terminated the long-standing alliance between France and the 
Ottoman Empire through expansionism into the Middle East and North Africa, in 1806 
Napoleon sent to the Empire his envoy Horace Sebastiani, who successfully—if briefly— 
managed to convince the Porte to keep the Straits open to French warships.12 
To the end of keeping the Straits under Ottoman control, the British signed the 
Treaty of the Dardanelles with the Sultan in 1809. For 300 years, the closure of the Turkish 
Straits to foreign warships was enshrined in international customs, only breached by the 
aforementioned special agreements with Russia and France in time of war. The Treaty of 
the Dardanelles would formalize this custom in a legal statute, enabling the passage of 
merchant ships—which particular privilege to British naval vessels—while barring the 
                                                 
11 Ibid, 22 
12 Efraim and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: the Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 11-12 
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passage of warships through the Straits.13 This treaty would also lead to the 1841 London 
Straits Convention, which overrode the access privileges granted to Russia in the 1833 
Hünkar-İskelesi Treaty and enshrined the universal recognition among the European 
powers of the Straits’ openness to commerce, as well as their closure during wartime, 
except at the discretion of the Porte.14 
Here we see the development of the principles that would guide the Turkish and 
global understanding of the Turkish Straits’ importance in the years to come, especially 
after World War I. Recognizing the value of the Straits as a means of communication and 
commerce for the European powers, as well as the vulnerability resulting from the 
possession of such valuable real estate, the Ottoman Empire sought to maintain its position 
in the Straits via diplomacy and alliances within the web of European powers. This 
diplomatic approach would lead to the recognition of the Straits’ openness to commerce 
and closure to military vessels not allied with the Sultan, two tenets of the Turkish Straits 
legal regime that would be further formalized in Lausanne and Montreux. 
However, these developments cast Ottoman diplomacy, legality, and sovereignty 
over the Turkish Straits as arising from a place of diplomacy, foreign protectionism, and 
Great Power interests rather than the military capacities of the Ottoman Empire, a status 
that would be solidified through the Black Sea Conference of 1871. Despite the professed 
resolve of the Great Powers to respect and uphold Ottoman territorial integrity in 
accordance with the 1856 Treaty of Paris, the Ottoman Empire had suffered heavy material 
                                                 
13 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Treaty of Çanak,” Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1998. Accessed 
April 29, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Canak 
14 Rozakis and Stagos, 24-25. 
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losses by that time, placing the Porte in a debilitated bargaining position. Kostaki Musurus 
Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador to London, wrote a letter to Ali Pasha lamenting this 
position, noting that “our friends have become accustomed to expect everything from us 
without giving us anything in return.”15 The expected passivity of the Ottoman Empire had 
evidence in the initial aims of the British to preserve the “status quo” in the Straits 
irrespective of Ottoman interests in maintaining sovereignty and the right to open or close 
the Straits to allies in wartime. Ultimately, Italy produced a compromise acceptable to the 
Porte, saying that the Sultan could open or close the Straits in accordance with the 1856 
Treaty of Paris rather than the “interests and security of the empire.”16 
 Yet the ability of the Ottoman Empire to adhere to this treaty would rely on the 
Porte’s military capacity to defend its territory, a capacity that the Russian tsar and his 
Foreign Minister Sazonov sought to undermine at every turn during World War I. 
Throughout the war, Russia courted Britain and France to curry favor for support of Russia 
acquiring the Turkish Straits and Istanbul pending an Entente victory. In this war, the 
Ottoman Empire’s lack of agency and inability to defend the Straits militarily became 
readily apparent, as the Porte largely maintained control of the Straits as a result of 
diplomatic intrigue between Russia, Great Britain, and France, as well as the incapacity 
and limited development of the Russian navy. Bobroff makes the argument that despite the 
academic consensus on the success of Sazonov’s push for control of the Straits, Sazonov’s 
emphasis on acquiring this territory would prove a fatal mistake, since it alienated 
                                                 
15 Barbara Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question, 1870-1887, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973, p. 51 
16 Ibid, 56 
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Moscow’s allies, especially France.17 In this way, the Ottoman Empire managed to fend 
off Russian advances; however, this victory would prove pyrrhic after the Entente victory 
and the implementation of British and French designs to divide the Empire’s territories. 
 
The Turkish Straits Legal Regime from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic 
 
 If the events of the 17th-19th centuries and World War I have informed Turkish 
protection of the Straits as a matter of sovereignty and realist diplomacy with the Great 
Powers of Europe, the first years of the Turkish Republic reveal the significance of the 
Turkish Straits as a symbol of modern Turkey’s emergence from the disaster of World War 
I. As shown in the previous section, prior to 1914 the Ottoman Empire benefited from its 
international perception as the “sick man of Europe” and the interest of larger powers such 
as Great Britain in having the Straits controlled by a weaker state rather than a stronger 
one. However, this strategy could only last so long, and despite its best efforts to resist 
occupation of and disarmament in the Dardanelles, the Ottoman Empire would ultimately 
lose the Turkish Straits to a joint military operation by Britain and India.18 For the newly 
founded Turkish Republic to regain control of the Straits and its lost territories, its leaders 
would have to take military initiative to retake the Straits and govern them from a position 
of military strength rather than international diplomacy. 
                                                 
17 Ronald Park Bobroff, Late Imperial Russia and the Turkish Straits: Roads to Glory, London: I.B. Tauris 
& Co., 2006, pp. 152-153 
18 A.L. MacFie, “The Straits Question in the First World War, 1914-1918,” in Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 
19, January 1983, pp. 43-74 
17 
 
 In the years from 1918 to 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk would undertake to 
accomplish this very goal. Through a series of military victories in the Turkish War of 
Independence (1918-1922), the National Movement continued to push for the reclamation 
(or “liberation” in official parlance) of the Dardanelles and even Thrace, to the growing 
alarm of Britain.19 The military advances of the milli mücadele even won the admiration 
of Turkey’s perennial rival Russia, which—now under the administration of the Soviet 
Union—sent a letter congratulating Turkey on its defeat of Greek forces and, by extension, 
the impositions of European imperialism.20 Turkish reassertion of military strength and a 
newfound strategic partnership with Russia placed Atatürk and his foreign minister İnönü 
in a stronger position, enabling Turkey to enter into the negotiations that would produce 
the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. 
Former Turkish ambassador Kemal Girgin describes this period of conquest as the 
Büyük Zafer, or “great victory,” highlighting Turkish pride—both officially and 
nationally—in these conquests, which led to the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and the 
Montreux Convention in 1936.21 Baskın Oran describes the first of these documents, the 
Treaty of Lausanne, as “a treaty signed by equals,” the first of its kind since World War I; 
indeed, as the previous section demonstrates, much of the legal framework governing the 
Straits and the Empire’s territories more broadly prior to World War I saw the Ottoman 
                                                 
19 Kemal Girgin, Ruslarla Kavgadan-Derin Ortaklığa (Son Yüz Senemiz: 1914-2014) [From Conflict to 
Cooperation with the Russians (The Last Hundred Years: 1914-2014)], Istanbul: İlgi Kültür Sanat 
Yayıncılık, 2014, pp. 239-240 




Empire negotiating from a position of weakness.22 This new treaty solidified the new 
borders of the Republic of Turkey, primarily in accordance with military gains, and 
recognized the Republic of Turkey’s sovereignty over the Turkish Straits, with many of 
the protections and rights previously ascribed to the Ottoman Empire left intact. While the 
Straits would remain open for merchant ships in time of peace, the Treaty of Lausanne 
gave Turkey control over entry of both merchant and military vessels in time of war as a 
matter of national security. However, the treaty also demilitarized certain areas of the 
Straits region, a matter which—as Atatürk noticed—posed issues of political realism for 
the Turkish government and military. 
Oran notes that Turkey accepted these restrictions on its sovereignty reluctantly, in 
the hopes that naval disarmament measures being taken alongside the negotiation of the 
Treaty of Lausanne would contribute to greater regional security overall. However, the 
successes of the 1921-1922 Washington Naval Disarmament Conference and the London 
Conference of 1930, both of which limited the tonnage of military vessels, could not stop 
the naval arms race; by 1934 the rise of Nazism had also compelled Germany to withdraw 
from disarmament talks.23 Against this backdrop, Turkish diplomats in the early 1930s 
urged the parties to the Lausanne Straits Convention to re-examine the provisions of the 
treaty that called for disarmament of parts of the Straits. In 1936, based on the international 
legal principle of rebus sic stantibus, Turkey’s petition for a re-examination of this clause 
                                                 
22 Baskın Oran, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents, Salt Lake City: 
The University of Utah Press, 2010, pp. 126-140 
23 Oran, 224 
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began to gain favor among an international community increasingly troubled by the rise of 
Nazism and Italian fascism. 
Thus, in the Montreux Conference of 1936, Turkey “was returned all that it had lost 
in Lausanne and its sovereignty and control over the Straits was restored.”24 The legality 
of militarizing the Straits allowed for defense of the sovereignty granted to Turkey, 
which—as the events of World War II would show—remained fragile and susceptible to 
expansionist interests. The participants in this conference affirmed the Montreux 
Convention as crucial to the security of both Turkey and the other Black Sea States. This 
consideration of the Straits Question within the broader framework of Black Sea security 
speaks to the regional power and influence that Turkey gained via the international legal 
recognition of its sovereignty over the Turkish Straits. 
 Despite the development of a legal regime favorable to Turkish sovereignty and 
national security in the Straits, Turkey remained concerned about realpolitik and the 
potential for power shifts to undo its territorial gains. This realist concern continues to the 
present day, as Ahmet Davutoğlu notes the problem of armament in the Aegean Islands 
and the challenges posed thereby to Turkish control of the Straits.25 Azerbaijani academic 
Jamil Hasanlı notes that even a few years after Russia signed the Montreux Convention 
with Turkey and the European powers, Stalin held designs to acquire the Turkish Straits 
by force, or to pressure Turkey to renegotiate the Montreux Convention. For example, amid 
negotiations with Germany for Axis membership, Stalin addressed Comintern Executive 
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Committee Secretary-General Georgi Dmitrov on November 25, 1940 to lay out a plan for 
negotiation strategies, which included the demand “that the Germans uphold Soviet 
interests in Turkey.”26 Soviet interests in rewriting the Montreux Convention to privilege 
other Black Sea countries at the expense of Turkey continued throughout World War II, 
with Stalin aiming to convince Britain and France of his position and the need to re-
evaluate the convention heading into the 1944 Yalta Conference.27 In light of this position 
and the similar position taken by the Soviets at Potsdam, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, a journalist 
for Turkish newspaper Tanin, wrote as follows: 
“We are astonished that the most serious British newspaper cannot realize the gist 
of the Straits problem and Russian claims on the issue. Europeans and Americans 
think that the Russians want the Straits to be free… No! Russians do not want the 
opening of the Straits; they want the closing of the Straits! They want the Straits to 
be closed and opened to comply with Russian interests. They do not want control 
over the Straits by Europeans or Americans, i.e. their enemies. They want to use 
the Straits as a base for their aggressive intentions.”28 
 
 These Soviet ambitions would come to a head during the Soviet War of Nerves 
against Turkey from 1945 to 1953, which saw the development of the Turkish Crisis and 
the accession of Turkey to NATO. Both Stalin and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov sought 
to expand their influence by pressuring Turkey to accept Russian military bases in the 
Straits, a development which—given the size and resource disparities between Russia and 
Turkey—would create a serious asymmetry of power that would threaten Turkish 
sovereignty in the Straits.29 Among the Soviet arguments for renegotiating the convention 
                                                 
26 Hasanlı, 10 
27 Ibid, 32-36 
28 Ibid, 102 
29 Ibid, 84-87 
21 
 
was the participation of Japan, which no longer had relevance to the convention due to its 
decimated economic and political situation; however, Stalin sought to use this anachronism 
to push for further changes to the status quo. This initiative led to several Soviet military 
attempts to seize control of the Straits, concurrent with efforts to gain footing in the 
Caucasus and leverage territorial claims from Soviet Georgia and Armenia to pressure 
Turkey for more concessions.30 By 1951, Turkey was seeking aid from and accession to 
NATO in order to combat threats of a possible Soviet attack; on the recommendation of 
the CIA, both Turkey and Greece gained this status on October 15, 1951. 
 
Implications for Foreign Policy 
 
 The writings of chief officials in the Turkish government of recent years confirm 
the Republic’s perceived need to project both hard and soft power in the nation, taking an 
active role in regional politics rather than acting as a passive onlooker. To the end of 
maintaining a stable diplomatic situation, Ahmet Davutoğlu—who has served as both 
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs under Erdoğan—lays out a vision of a 
Turkey that relies on its ties with Islamic countries to project soft power and diplomatic 
influence in his book Stratejik Derinlik. Even prior to Davutoğlu’s vision of Islamic 
liberalism, former Turkish President (1989-1993) and leader of the center-right Anavatan 
(Motherland) Party criticized the country’s foreign policy establishment for pursuing a 
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passive foreign policy more similar to İnönü than Atatürk, to which end he would establish 
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Özal elaborates: 
“Their basic principle is this: do not meddle in the affairs of others! According to 
the foreign ministry, it is necessary to observe the environment before deciding on 
a policy course. They consider it a success to [follow] the middle way of what others 
have been doing. They consider it prudent to follow the lead of others. They are the 
followers of İsmet İnönü who sought to maintain the status quo… Everyone talks 
about Atatürkism and praise[s] Atatürk. Yet the bureaucracy follows the line of 
İnönü and never that of Atatürk. The military, civilian, domestic and foreign affairs, 
the entire Turkish bureaucracy follows the line of İnönü.”31 
 
 The rise of the United Nations and the enshrinement of formal international 
recognition of states into law has not entirely mitigated the geopolitical power struggle that 
shaped the legal regime of the Turkish Straits, even if incidents such as Russia’s 2014 
annexation of Crimea have become more an exception than a rule. Moreover, the Turkish 
Straits remain important in the present day for political reasons, as petroleum is shipped 
from Caspian Sea gas fields through the Turkish Straits to reach the Mediterranean.32 
According to the US Congressional Research Service, “[t]he Foreign Ministry notes that 
Turkey is geographically close to 72% of the world proven gas and 73% of its oil reserves 
in the Middle East and Caspian Basin.”33 
In particular, the US, Turkey, and NATO allies have invested significantly in the 
flow of oil from Azerbaijan to two Turkish cities—Ceyhan on the Mediterranean and 
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Erzurum on the Black Sea—via pipelines running through Tbilisi.34 Geographically, the 
Ceyhan pipeline directly bypasses the Straits to access the Mediterranean Sea, while the 
gas from the Erzurum pipeline must pass through the Black Sea or over land to reach its 
final destination. However, another pipeline currently in construction—known as the 
Nabucco West or Turkey-Austria pipeline—would link Erzurum to markets in Europe, 
allowing the Erzurum pipeline to bypass the Straits as well. Such a development could 
grant NATO ally Turkey significantly more mobility for energy transit than neighbor and 
rival Russia, since—as Migdalovitz writes—the latter must still rely on the Turkish Straits 
as a conduit to the Mediterranean Sea.35 Russia appears to have taken notice of this 
potential threat to its energy hegemony, having voiced strong opposition to the project.36 
This proximity to key energy reserves further highlights the significance of present 
geopolitical conflicts in Turkey’s neighborhood, including ongoing wars in the Middle 
East, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the 
tensions in Georgia over the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Here, 
too, Turkey’s protection of the Straits and distrust of American unilateral interventionism 
in regional affairs, both backed by popular support, have created problems for the 
fulfillment of US policy goals, as exemplified in the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, sparked 
by Georgian attempts to reassert control of the breakaway republic of South Ossetia. 
Despite the clear and present threats posed by this conflict to Turkey’s security and 
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economic interests—particularly considering Tbilisi’s status as a hub for present and 
planned pipeline projects—Erdoğan sought to remain neutral in accordance with his “zero 
problems with neighbors” policy, as well as to maintain the growing economic ties between 
Russia and Turkey. This development speaks to the aforementioned role of the Montreux 
Convention in enabling Turkey to exert greater regional influence in the Black Sea area 
and over peripheral countries such as Azerbaijan. 
Erdoğan therefore rejected the Bush administration’s proposal to send warships 
large enough to violate the Montreux Convention through the Turkish Straits, and signaled 
to Washington that Turkey “would not be a willing participant in a policy of confrontation 
with its important neighbor.”37 This strict adherence to the Turkish Straits legal regime 
signaled a distrust of foreign intervention later echoed by Turkey’s close ally Azerbaijan, 
whose Prime Minister greeted Vice President Dick Cheney, who had arrived to discuss 
plans for the Nabucco pipeline project, with a cold reception in Baku. Moscow applauded 
these efforts against American action in the Caucasus and urged Turkey—a growing ally 
both at the time and in the present day, despite Turkey’s attack of a Russian fighter jet in 
2015—to continue resisting American pressure to renegotiate the Montreux Convention.38 
Turkey’s resistance to sacrificing sovereignty and military agency for the sake of 
expediency has precedent dating back to the formation of NATO and Turkey’s accession 
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in 1952: while not expressly opposed to integration, Turkey would insist on its chief of 
staff retaining control over its armed forces.39 
In the wake of the April 16 referendum on granting Erdoğan’s ambitions for 
sweeping constitutional reform, as well as the political posturing undertaken by Erdoğan 
against European countries and the leader’s rapprochement with Russia, the Turkish Straits 
could serve as a potential site of leverage to maintain strong relations with Turkey.40 Given 
Moscow’s present encouragement of and support for Turkey to maintain the statutes of the 
Montreux Convention against American pressure, a significant push by the US to 
renegotiate the convention—even if, as Ünlü suggests, the convention is anachronistic and 
overdue for revisitation—risks pushing Turkey closer to Moscow’s sphere of influence. 
Indeed, the history of Russian engagement in the Turkish Straits from 1945 to 1953 might 





 Historical analysis shows that the development of the present-day Turkish Straits 
legal regime can be understood to a significant degree as a matter of geopolitical 
pragmatism and realpolitik. Rulers from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic have 
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understood the economic advantage and vulnerability to invasion and military campaigns 
that come with control of the Straits. At its peak, the Ottoman Empire had an ample buffer 
of land to protect from foreign invasion, enabling the Sultan to assert control over the Black 
Sea as an Ottoman lake. Although this influence diminished with territorial losses to Russia 
and European powers over several centuries, the Ottoman Empire managed to maintain its 
control of the Turkish Straits by playing competing power interests off of each other; the 
conception of Straits law as a system open to merchant passage and closed to military 
vessels not aligned with the Sultan became formally enshrined in legal statutes during this 
period. However, the events of World War I and the strategic, realpolitik interests of both 
the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance would spell the end of the Ottoman Empire’s 
diplomatic mediation of the Straits.  
As the Turkish Republic formed, Atatürk’s military campaigns to reclaim lands lost 
during World War I enabled the Republic to uphold both the Treaty of Lausanne and the 
Montreux Convention from a position of strength as well as diplomacy. However, realist 
concerns regarding the Turkish Straits would continue to arise throughout World War II, 
particularly due to the Soviet expansionism that would culminate in the 1946 Turkish 
Straits crisis. This state of affairs has led to the accession of Turkey to NATO and the 
solidification of Turkey as a key ally of the US However, as this analysis shows, Turkey 
remains highly protective of its position in the Turkish Straits, maintaining a military 
presence in the Straits—albeit one that Váli describes as symbolic—and working actively 
to uphold the Straits legal regime from a position of military dominance and strength rather 
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than reliance on foreign protectionism.41 Given Erdoğan’s recent denunciations of 
European leaders, the controversy over EU membership and the German refugee deal, and 
Turkey’s growing economic cooperation and rapprochement with Russia, the Straits’ 
economic, political, and symbolic significance to Turkey highlights numerous options for 
US leverage to maintain strong ties with a rapidly changing nation. 
 
Limitations, Avenues for Future Research, and Connections with Present Research 
 
 The history of Great Power competition and conflict in the Turkish Straits has been 
documented extensively in academic literature, which allows for a high degree of 
confidence in this thesis; however, this analysis will benefit greatly from additional 
archival or other primary sources, such as many of the works cited in this thesis draw upon. 
While the present thesis’ analysis allows for an understanding of the geopolitical forces 
that shaped the regime of the Turkish Straits, a deeper understanding of these historical 
events in the Turkish context necessitates an analysis of important actors in Turkish foreign 
policy and the role of their philosophies, such as neo-Ottomanism, in shaping an 
understanding of past events and future goals. This subject will be analyzed in the third 
chapter of this thesis, which will examine the broad theoretical lenses of both neo-
Ottomanism and neo-Eurasianism to determine the impact of each on the decision-making 
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process in foreign policy and provide insight into the ideal approach to conducting US 
diplomacy with Turkey and Russia.  
The backdrop of geopolitical competition and conflict against which the Straits 
Question arises also has a significant religious dimension. Moscow, for instance, 
collaborated with Pope Nicholas V to wage military campaigns against Istanbul and restore 
the city of Constantinople, in accordance with the Pope’s ecumenical ambitions of a unified 
Church. Similarly, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca’s provisions gave Russia permission to 
expand the Church into the Ottoman Empire and granted Moscow protector status over the 
empire’s Eastern Orthodox community.42 Indeed, Moscow sought to expand this protector 
status into the newly emerging Balkan States, which Russia saw as “the antechamber to 
the Turkish Straits.”43 Considering the extent to which religious interests financed and 
interconnected with state interests in imperial European politics, as well as the focus of this 
thesis on international relations and foreign policy rather than religion, I have opted not to 
include this religious component within the scope of this analysis.  
However, given the rise of neo-Ottomanism, the Islamic liberalism espoused by the 
AKP, the persistence of Christian communities in Turkey, and Erdoğan’s recent 
denunciations of Islamophobic leaders in Europe, the subject of religion may prove fertile 
for future research.44 Additionally, conceptions of Moscow as an outward-looking “castle” 
city holding the mantle of the Orthodox “Third Rome,” as some academics and Russian 
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writers have suggested, have played significant roles in the discourse between 
Westernization and Slavophilia since the mid-17th century with the schism (raskol) in the 
Russian Church.45 The third chapter of this thesis will analyze the role of this discourse in 
shaping Russian foreign policy, although with more of a focus on the Orthodox Church as 
a figure within a broader Russian and Slavic identity. 
 Finally, while this analysis has focused on the legal regime surrounding the Turkish 
Straits, a comprehensive understanding of the Straits’ present legal framework will benefit 
from an analysis of the legal regimes governing other bodies of water which interact with 
the Straits in economic trade and cooperation. The aforementioned concerns of Russia over 
the BTC pipeline as an “unwarranted curtailment of [its] natural rights in the South 
Caucasus” highlight the ever-present importance of oil supply, as well as the international 
legal framework and customs governing its transit, in determining economic and political 
influence.46 Moreover, the critical importance of Azerbaijan as a US and Turkish ally and 
the country’s access to Caspian Sea oil fields necessitate an understanding of how the 
Caspian, Mediterranean, and Black Sea legal regimes interact with the Turkish Straits legal 
regime. The development of the Caspian Sea legal regime—which remains a contentious 
process to this day—and the ramifications of this development for Turkish-Russian 
relations will be analyzed in the following chapter. 
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The Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea: Stakes of Turkey and Russia 
 
 The Caspian Sea lies at the center of an ongoing debate between five countries, 
including Russia, over its legal status and the military enforcement thereof. Turkey has 
cooperated with one of these countries, Azerbaijan, to develop two pipelines passing from 
Baku to Turkey via Tbilisi, and has a vested interest in the Caspian Sea’s legal regime for 
the further development of Azerbaijan’s Southern Gas Corridor. However, Russia, which 
views NATO action in the Caspian Sea with considerable skepticism, has taken a strong 
stance against NATO military involvement in the region and threatened military action 
against projects currently in development. Beginning with an analysis of the legal history 
of the Caspian Sea and the motives of strategic actors in the region, this thesis will establish 
the hegemony of geostrategic relations and military capacity in determining the Caspian 
legal regime. Bearing this framework in mind, this thesis will proceed to analyze the 
strategic positions and capabilities of Turkey and Russia in the Caspian Sea in order to 
determine potential ramifications for their bilateral relations. 
Theoretical Background, Scope and Relevant Actors 
 This thesis analyzes the Caspian legal regime from a realist perspective, with the 
understanding that legal agreements between two or more countries arise from international 
power dynamics and may be revised by changes in the international order. The relevance 
of this paradigm will become apparent upon examination of the Caspian legal regime’s 
history, throughout which legal agreements signed between Iran and the USSR or its 
successor states have failed to enter into force or led to one state’s unilateral domination. 
31 
 
The continued buildup of naval forces in the littoral states also indicates an ever-present 
interest in legal revisionism, as well as mistrust of other littoral states and foreign 
involvement.47 Indeed, in the absence of a new, formalized legal agreement between Iran 
and the USSR’s successor states, Bahman Diba argues in favor of operating as though the 
previous legal regime created with the USSR were still in force.48 
 Other scholars, such as Barbara Janusz-Pawletta, take an internationalist approach 
to understanding the development of the Caspian Sea legal regime, stressing the security 
and ecological urgency of creating a formalized legal regime drawing on norms established 
by documents such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.49 Janusz-
Pawletta’s approach to understanding the Caspian legal regime focuses mostly on the 
urgency of developing a commonly accepted Caspian legal framework to settle disputes 
and achieve long-term environmental protection. However, the implementation and 
enshrinement of international legal norms in the Caspian legal regime presupposes the 
acceptance of this paradigm as legitimate by the littoral states. Excluding Kazakhstan, 
which has drawn on international legal frameworks and precedents to propose a “modified 
middle line” model for Caspian Sea division that would also enable Kazakh access to the 
Volga River, none of the littoral states accept international law as an acceptable framework 
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for governing the Caspian region.50 In fact, Russia and Iran, with the support and 
occasionally the coercion of both littoral and non-littoral states, have led efforts to keep 
NATO out of the Caspian region and to keep determination of the Caspian’s legal status, 
with all the power entailed thereby, between the littoral states.51 
 In any case, the bulk of Janusz-Pawletta’s book, which provides a wealth of details 
on the formation and controversies of the Caspian legal status and regime, focuses the bulk 
of its investigation on environmental issues. This present thesis focuses on the Caspian 
legal regime’s implications for Turkish-Russian relations, particularly concerning the 
construction of energy pipelines, Turkish involvement with NATO, and the potential for 
conflict arising from Turkey’s close relationship to Azerbaijan and its friction with the 
historical alignment of Russia and Iran with Armenia. Since Turkey is not a Caspian littoral 
state and therefore neither bound by nor party to the agreements concluded regarding the 
use of the sea, issues such as navigation, environmental protection, and use of living 
resources such as the sturgeon population fall beyond the scope of this analysis. However, 
as Janusz-Pawletta demonstrates, they represent critical fields of analysis for future 
research. 
 Due to this focus on areas of potential conflict between Turkey and Russia, this 
thesis considers the Turkish and Russian states as the primary relevant actors and units of 
analysis. Additionally, given the ongoing contestation of the Caspian Sea’s legal regime, 
the Caspian littoral states play an important role in determining the capacity of Turkey and 
                                                 
50 Diba, 48-52 
51 Jacopo Dettoni, “Russia and Iran Lock NATO Out of Caspian Sea,” The Diplomat, October 1, 2014 
33 
 
Russia to act in their interests. Turkey’s status as a NATO member and long-standing US 
interests in Caspian oil development and containment of Russian and Iranian influence 
render the US a relevant actor in this field. Finally, the stakes of national and multinational 
oil corporations in the Southern Gas Corridor and other Caspian pipeline projects merit 
analysis based on corporate interests and the interests of the companies’ respective states. 
Figure 1 shows the division of shares in the projects proposed via the so-called “Contract 
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Shares of International Oil Companies in Azerbaijani 
Pipeline Projects
SOCAR (Azerbaijan) BP (UK) AMOCO (US)
Lukoil (Russia) Pennzoil (US) Unocal (US)
Statoil (Norway) McDermott Int'l (US) Ramco (Scotland)
Turkish State Oil Delta-Nimir (Saudi Arabia)
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History of the Caspian Legal Regime: Pre-1990 
 
 Upon creating Russia’s Caspian Flotilla in 1722, Peter the Great remarked: “Our 
interests will never allow any other nation to claim the Caspian Sea,” a quote now 
memorialized in a plaque at the flotilla’s headquarters. For most of its history, Russia 
fulfilled this pledge, maintaining its dominance in the Caspian Sea through conquests and 
victories over neighboring Persia. In the 1723 Treaty of St. Petersburg, Persia surrendered 
the territories of Derbent, Mazandaran, Astarabad and Baku to Russia, thus establishing 
Russia’s de facto hegemony over the Caspian. Although the signature of the Treaty of 
Rashd (1729) returned some of these lands and granted Persia access to the Caspian Sea, 
the subsequent treaties of Golestan (1813) and Turkamanchai (1828), emblematic of 
Persia’s military losses to Russia, granted Russia the exclusive rights to maintain a naval 
presence in the Caspian.53 
 During the time of the Tsars, Russia advanced the concept of a “closed sea” to 
describe the regime of the Caspian and Black Seas. This concept entailed the creation of 
ten-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZ) off the borders of the two littoral states and 
governing the inner portion of the Caspian Sea in accordance with international governance 
norms for the “high sea”: that is, merchant ships could pass freely and dock with no 
restrictions. In fact, over a century later the Soviet Union called for the enshrinement of 
this principle in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea, a proposal rejected 
by the United States, Great Britain, and other powers due to its potential restrictiveness on 
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state actions.54 However, as of March 2014 Iran supports the application of the “closed 
sea” concept to the Caspian legal regime. 
 After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet Union, seeking to undo the imperialist 
policies of its predecessor state, abrogated the Treaty of Turkamanchai in 1921 with the 
Treaty of Friendship between Iran and the USSR. This treaty afforded to both states the 
free, unrestricted right of navigation in all parts of the Caspian Sea.55 Additionally, the 
Treaty of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation, concluded between Iran and the 
USSR in 1935, established exclusive economic zones of ten nautical miles off the 
coastlines of each country for fishing purposes and allowed ships from each state to fly 
their own flag outside of this economic zone. Iran and the USSR expanded this treaty in 
1940 to stipulate that ships flying foreign flags would be barred from sailing in the Caspian 
Sea. Despite the contemporary arguments by certain littoral states against the application 
of the 1921 and 1940 treaties after the USSR’s dissolution, both Diba and Janusz-Pawletta 
argue that these treaties retain their validity for determining the legal status of the Caspian 
Sea. 
 Yet in spite of these documents, Diba argues that the power dynamics at work on 
the Caspian Sea contradicted the black-letter text of the concluded agreements. Soviet ships 
accounted for the vast majority of the naval presence in the Caspian Sea, and Iran, partly 
out of a desire not to antagonize the Soviet Union, refrained from sailing north.56 Moreover, 
although the presence of oil in the Caspian region had been known since Robert Nobel’s 
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establishment of Petrole Nobel Freres in Baku in 1873, the 1921 and 1940 treaties did not 
regulate the use of the Caspian’s non-living resources. In practice, Russian control of the 
Caspian translated to Russian domination over seabed exploration and oil prospecting, 
even extracting what would today be considered Iran’s share of Caspian oil resources.57 
This subject, however, remains a critical point for modern negotiations between the littoral 
states over the Caspian legal status and regime. 
 
The Caspian Legal Regime after the Fall of the USSR 
 
Foreign Policy contributor Joshua Kucera argues that Russian hegemony over the 
Caspian Sea remained uncontested for much of history due to its contemporary status as a 
“strategic backwater.”58 However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and formation of three 
new littoral states—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan—has bestowed immense 
strategic value upon the Caspian Basin, whose countries remain locked in debate over the 
sea’s legal status. Russia, traditionally the Caspian hegemon, now contends with the 
growing naval forces of four other countries for the resource wealth of what geographers 
consider the world’s largest lake. Indeed, this question—whether to consider the Caspian 
a sea or a lake by legal standards—played a central role in much of the discourse on the 
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region’s legal regime after the fall of the Soviet Union,59 though by 2015 the littoral states 
had largely resolved the issue.60 
Immediately following the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia and Iran led an initiative 
to maintain the classification of the Caspian Sea as a lake shared by the littoral states on a 
condominium basis: under this paradigm, states could extract resources from the Caspian 
Sea as their needs demanded. Largely following the framework established by the 1921 
and 1940 treaties, Russia submitted its position to the UN on October 5, 1994, adding its 
support for “20-mile territorial waters plus an additional 20-mile exclusive economic zone 
leading to common ownership… by all riparian states.” Even as early as 1994, Russia took 
a firm stance against outsider intervention in the Caspian legal regime’s development, 
claiming inapplicability of the Law of the Sea and deeming any unilateral action “unlawful 
and [not] recognized by the Russian Federation.”61 
The newly formed Caspian littoral states have raised objections to reliance on the 
1921 and 1940 treaties. Azerbaijan, for instance, cited the legal principles of rebus sic 
stantibus and “Clean Slate” to argue that due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, previously 
concluded treaties between Iran and Russia—the latter recognized as the successor state of 
the Soviet Union—should not apply to the newly independent Central Asian republics. 
Kazakhstan, unique among the five littoral states, has called for determination of the 
Caspian legal regime in accordance with the 1982 Convention for the International Regime 
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of the Seas, partially due to its interests in preserving access to the Volga River via the 
Caspian Sea.62 These objections have hindered Russian efforts to preserve the 1921 and 
1940 treaties as the defining documents of the Caspian legal regime. 
However, Russia has worked to advance its interests in defining the Caspian legal 
regime through other means, including signing bilateral treaties with Kazakhstan on June 
6, 1998 and Azerbaijan on January 12, 2001.63 These documents affirmed Kazakh and 
Azeri support for Caspian seabed division according to the “Modified Median Line” 
principle, which Diba describes as follows: 
1. “Dividing the seabed of the Caspian Seas, according to a median or equidistance 
line from the shorelines of the concerned countries. 
2. Changing (or modifying) the line of demarcation, according to selected natural 
elements, such as seabed elevations and manmade elements, such as established 
installations (by mutual agreement). 
3. Leaving the superjacent waters free for navigation by all littoral countries of the 
Caspian Sea.”64 
Resolving the Caspian legal regime in this way would help to establish Russia as 
the hegemonic figure in Caspian affairs, as well as providing Russia with access to 20% of 
the Caspian seabed and establishing a maritime border with Iran that national division of 
the seabed would preclude. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, would gain access to 4 billion tons in 
hydrocarbon reserves, compared with the 2.84 billion tons of hydrocarbon reserves that 
would be claimed by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan under Iran’s proposal for equal division 
of the seabed. 
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Meanwhile, Iran’s position on the Caspian legal regime status has changed 
numerous times since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1994 Iran joined the newly-
formed former Soviet republics in calling for a littoral state consensus on the legal regime, 
while also pushing for an extension of each country’s EEZs to 20-50 miles off the coast 
and the formulation of a legal regime for issues not covered in the 1921 and 1940 treaties, 
including petroleum resource usage. After the meeting of the Organisation for Co-
operation between the Caspian Littoral States (OCCLS) in 1996, Iran agreed to a common 
use framework for Caspian Sea resource usage, which would allow countries to draw on 
Caspian resources on a condominium basis.65 However, since 1997 Iran has undergone a 
paradigm shift from an economic view of Caspian policy to a security view. Iran holds that 
Russia’s conclusion of the aforementioned bilateral treaties with Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan, which reinforce the hegemony of the “Modified Median Line,” violate the 
principle of littoral state consensus, and has since called for the equal division of the 
Caspian seabed between each of the littoral states.66 International Institute for Caspian 
Studies Chairman Abbas Maleki observes that since 2001, in view of what Iran considered 
illegitimate Russian bilateral treaties, the Iranian government conducts its affairs in the 
Caspian Sea with little regard for the previously established legal framework.67 
Turkmenistan has also lent some support to Iran’s equal distribution plan, as the modified 
median line distribution would favor Azerbaijan over Turkmenistan. 
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Geopolitical Developments, Alliances, and Capacities for Legal Revisionism 
 
Azerbaijan’s 1991 initiative to engage with multinational oil corporations for the 
development of its resource market, culminating in what is now known as the “Contract of 
the Century” in 1994, represents one of the key critical developments in the revision of the 
Caspian legal regime. This initiative has transformed Baku into a dominant regional actor 
not only in the economic sphere, but also in terms of military strength and diplomatic soft 
power. Initially, the other littoral states fiercely condemned Azerbaijan’s unilateral action 
on what Russia and Iran then considered a joint resource shared on a condominium basis 
between all of the littoral states and free of outside influence or intervention, but all of the 
littoral states have since followed suit in opening to foreign investment. This phenomenon 
demonstrates Azerbaijan’s capacity to alter precedents for joint use of Caspian resources, 
and the “labyrinth” position of Azerbaijan between Turkey, Russia, and Iran enables Baku 
to serve as a “Caucasian Geneva.”68 Moreover, Azerbaijan’s stronger connections with the 
West make the country an important hub to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan for access to 
Western markets, giving Azerbaijan a significant level of soft power, which İlham Aliyev 
could conceivably use to persuade Caspian littoral states to form coalitions regarding the 
sea’s legal regime. 
This soft power holds considerable relevance considering Azerbaijan’s alliance 
with Turkey, a relationship founded on deep cultural, historical, linguistic, and religious 
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bonds and reinforced by Turkish and European energy security interests, as well as ongoing 
tensions with Armenia. The collapse of the Soviet Union, together with linguistic bonds 
between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and other Central Asian Turkic states, gave rise to pan-Turkic 
sentiments under Turgut Özal, including increased Turkish investment in Central Asia.69 
Pan-Turkism has never since reached the peak of popularity it attained under Özal—a fact 
which Dekmejian and Simonian attribute largely to the resurgence of Russia and Iran—
and the rift between Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan and controversial Muslim cleric Fethullah 
Gülen has led to Turkish pressure on Central Asian states to close Gülenist schools, 
formerly a major source of Turkish soft power.70 However, the idea of pan-Turkism still 
holds sway among prominent Azerbaijanis: for instance, Azerbaijani academic and 
prominent member of Azerbaijan’s Human Rights Institute Elşən Nəsibov evokes pan-
Turkic sentiment in his support for Turkey as a model for exporting democracy, human 
rights, and free market economics to other Central Asian countries.71 Like Azerbaijan, 
Turkey serves as a major transit hub for many Central Asian countries to Europe, giving 
Turkey the potential to play a prominent role in the market integration of the Turkic 
Caspian littoral states and to negotiate coalitions regarding Caspian governance. 
Valiyev notes that Azerbaijan and Turkey maintain strong security ties despite the 
relative decline in pan-Turkic sentiment, and the conclusion of numerous pipeline and 
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railroad projects passing from Baku to Turkey through Tbilisi has greatly increased Turkish 
influence in the Caspian region.72 On the most basic level, Turkey has pushed for the 
construction of pipelines to Turkey as a means of reducing energy dependence on Russia, 
both for Turkey and the European Union.73 To this same end Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, 
and Turkey have even made plans for the construction of a Trans-Caspian pipeline that 
would link Turkmen gas to European markets via Turkey, although Russia would almost 
certainly oppose this plan diplomatically and militarily.74 However, Turkey also hopes its 
status as a hub for oil and gas will draw transit fees and other economic benefits, as well 
as reduce dependency on Arab and Russian petroleum and strengthen Turkey’s 
geostrategic position and relevance to Western interests.75 Turkey has also spoken out 
against the overreliance of foreign countries on the Turkish Straits for transit, decrying the 
potential for serious ecological damage to the Straits and stating that the Turkish 
government “would not allow the Bosphorus to become a pipeline for Caspian crude.”76 
Turkey has used access to the Straits as a geopolitical bargaining chip in the past, closing 
off Russian access in response to the 1993 Russian-backed coup in Georgia.77 
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Turkey’s membership in NATO, as well as its geostrategic position, has evoked 
considerable US interest in supporting Turkey’s dealings with the Caspian littoral states. 
For example, the US government provided American and Western oil companies with 
incentives to work on construction of the BTC pipeline passing through Turkey instead of 
the cheaper and more stable Baku-Supsa route planned by some oil companies.78 The US 
favored this plan—a part of a larger US-Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance—as a means of 
expanding Western influence into the Caucasus, ostensibly at the expense of Russian 
hegemony. Indeed, this plan coincides with the conclusion of an agreement between NATO 
members and some former Soviet states known as the GUUAM agreement, named after 
Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Armenia, and Moldova, countries concerned with a 
potential resurgence in Russian expansionism.79 The unique status of Turkey and 
Azerbaijan as predominantly Muslim allies of Israel—albeit with some hiccups in Turkey’s 
case—has also contributed to the solidification of the US relationship with Turkey, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia. 
Azerbaijan’s potential for alliance with Turkey—and hence with NATO—on issues 
of Caspian Sea geopolitics has certain limitations, to be sure. Azerbaijan’s 2007 National 
Security Strategy advanced the view of any economic or military dependence as a threat to 
Azerbaijani sovereignty. Moreover, despite Baku’s objection to the Russian-backed 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the organization’s support for 
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Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijani leaders also see NATO as 
inconsistent on the support of territorial integrity in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine.80 
As the regional hegemon and the successor to the Soviet Union, Russia retains 
significant influence over the development and potential revision of the Caspian legal 
regime. In addition to the aforementioned bilateral treaties with Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan, Russia’s Foreign Ministry has also worked to secure a legal status that would 
essentially grant Russia veto power over any proposed pipelines built in the Caspian Sea. 
These efforts include—but are not limited to—the signature of an agreement between 
Russia and Kazakhstan requiring joint approval of pipelines in shared waters.81 As late as 
2004, the Novorossiisk pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russia remained the sole route for the 
transport of gas to Europe, and even now, after the development of the BTC and BTE 
pipelines, Russian influence remains a dominant force shaping the Kazakh oil market.82 
Russia also has a history of stoking conflicts within country borders in order to gain 
political advantage. Despite reciprocal allegations between Moscow and Ankara of 
interference in Eastern Anatolia, Chechnya, and Dagestan, Turkey and Russia have 
generally agreed not to engage in incitement of domestic insurgency against each other due 
partly to the high trade volume between the two, which surpasses Turkey’s trade with all 
of Central Asia.83 However, Russia has numerous opportunities to place pressure on 
countries aligned with Turkey in order to create a political climate more favorable to its 
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interests. Russian support of Armenian fighters in Nagorno-Karabakh—to the tune of $1 
billion—provides such an example,84 and the formation of an axis between Russian, Iran, 
Armenia, and Greece to combat perceived NATO intervention in the Caspian Sea indicates 
the possibility for Russia to use Nagorno-Karabakh as a bargaining chip or pressure point 
in the future. Additionally, some of the oil pipelines of the Southern Gas Corridor run 
through disputed or otherwise dangerous territories, a situation which Russia may have a 
capacity to exploit in order to diminish Turkish and NATO influence over the Caspian legal 
regime. For instance, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) runs from 
Turkey’s border with Georgia—a country with prominent irredentist movements in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia that Russia has supported in the past—to Turkey’s border with 
Greece, a border made contentious by the Cyprus issue and the presence of Russian 
warships. Considering the high priority assigned to Georgia by Moscow due to the former’s 
Black Sea location, Russian intervention in the country’s irredentist movements remains 
within the realm of possibility.85 
 Russia and Iran remain wary of NATO intervention and its potential to infringe on 
regional interests. In 2014 NATO engaged in talks with leaders of Caspian littoral states, 
offering naval development assistance and aiming to negotiate a NATO-leaning naval base 
in Aktau, Kazakhstan. However, led by Russia and Iran, the Caspian states made clear that 
they would not welcome a NATO military presence. Iran in particular expressed concern 
that the US might use Caspian naval bases to place pressure on Iran’s nuclear program.86 
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Since 2014, Iran and the United States have signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
limiting Iran’s nuclear capability in exchange for the easing of sanctions. However, this 
deal remains controversial in the US, and while President Donald Trump has not 
successfully managed to nullify the JCPOA as promised in his campaign, his recent 
decision to decertify Iran’s compliance with the deal has called the agreement’s future into 
question. Given the interest of NATO, Turkey, and the US in neighboring Azerbaijan, 
NATO leaders could utilize Azerbaijani soft power and recent developments in Iranian 
relations to persuade Iran to join Azerbaijan and other Caspian states in pushing for 
revision of the Caspian legal regime. However, Russia’s high level of military cooperation 
with Iran on matters such as the Syria conflict and sales of weapons to Iran would certainly 





 The ongoing debate over the legal status and allocation of resources in the Caspian 
Sea leaves ample opportunities for regional and international state actors to alter the 
precedents and power dynamics governing the legal regime, whether through hard military 
strength or soft-power coalition building. The future of this legal regime will rely not only 
on consensus between the five littoral states, but also on the capacity of each state to build 
alliances with each other and with actors outside the immediate Caspian Sea region. Russia 
will no doubt view Turkish plans for the expansion of pipelines to Turkey and Europe from 
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as far away as China with suspicion of intent to subvert Russian’s hegemonic position in 
the region and undermine Russia’s gas exports. Turkey’s membership in NATO and the 
particular attention paid by American foreign policymakers to the Caspian region has 
granted Turkey the potential to exert considerable influence over the debate on Caspian 
resource allocation, and the interdependence of the Turkish and Russian economies may 
render direct conflict between the two inadvisable. However, Russia can still check Turkish 
influence in the Caspian by other means, including support for irredentist movements in 
Armenia and Georgia and a long-standing military alliance with Iran, aimed largely at 
combating foreign intervention in the Caspian Sea.  
 
Limitations, Avenues for Future Research, and Connections with Present Research 
 
 The present thesis’s focus on areas of geostrategic conflict between Turkey and 
Russia does not negate the crucial importance of environmental protection in the Caspian 
Basin and mitigation of the adverse effects of petroleum extraction in the Caspian Sea. 
Already many parts of Caspian waters are considered unsafe for swimming, and scientists 
have warned that pollution in the area could turn the Caspian Sea into a marsh if left 
unchecked.87 Mustafa Aydın places much of the blame on the Soviet Union, saying that 
“[t]he general ecological situation throughout the region is already beyond recovery.”88  
Additionally, Azerbaijani development in the Caspian Sea has raised concerns at the 
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Iranian-based International Institute for Caspian Studies that pollution from Baku might 
spill over into Iran or other countries. Azerbaijan has proposed relying on the Caspian 
Environment Project, a joint project of the World Bank and Global Environment Fund, but 
Turkmenistan and Iran have not signed onto this project, and the involvement of 
international organizations may raise Russian and Iranian suspicions.89 Caspian petroleum 
extraction has also adversely affected the sea’s sturgeon population, a population crucial 
to the Russian caviar industry as well as the overall Caspian ecosystem.90 Although the 
Caspian littoral states, especially Russia and Iran, would likely reject Janusz-Pawletta’s 
proposal to apply international legal principles to the Caspian environmental regime, the 
pressure of environmental pollution on the caviar population will require the negotiation 
of environmental principles and regulation in the area, either regionally or internationally. 
 The politicization of environmental impact in the Caspian also merits further 
investigation. In spite of the considerable attention given to Azerbaijan’s environmentally 
dangerous activities in the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil fields, Russia remains the most 
significant polluter in the Caspian Sea.91 Aydın notes the irony of Russia raising 
environmental concerns over the declining sturgeon population given this fact, suggesting 
that Russia may be using these environmental concerns as a coded means of pushing its 
own agenda for the Caspian legal regime. 
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 The expansion of China’s Silk Road project and the yuan’s increasing purchasing 
power will likely cause China to become a significant player in Caspian politics, especially 
as rapid industrialization and urban development increase Chinese energy needs 
drastically. Turkmenistan has emerged in strong competition with Russia as a supplier of 
petroleum to China, and its connection to the Caspian Sea may provide China with an outlet 
to engage with other gas-rich Caspian littoral states. Already an April 1, 2017 plan for a 
Trans-Caspian pipeline passing from China to Ukraine through Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan has provoked fierce opposition and even threats of military action from 
Russia.92 Chinese involvement in the region could complicate matters further, opening new 
avenues for future conflict or cooperation. 
 As with the chapter on the Turkish Straits, analysis of the Caspian legal regime 
from a realist perspective, which this chapter has sought to undertake, provides valuable 
insight into the factors that are likely to influence the decisions made by either the Turkish 
or the Russian government. However, such knowledge can only go so far in predicting how 
either of these states will act in the future. To prepare for the most likely outcomes of 
Turkish and Russian competition and cooperation in the Turkish Straits and the Caspian, 
we have to understand how national identity, history, and self-perception affect the 
decisions of those in power. This thesis will aim to answer that question in the third chapter. 
 
  
                                                 
92 Dettoni, “Russia and Iran Lock NATO Out of Caspian Sea” 
50 
 
The Influence of Self-Perception on Turkish-Russian Relations 
 
 Thus far the present thesis has analyzed the legal regimes of the Black and Caspian 
Sea littoral systems through the realist geopolitical lens developed by Western intellectuals 
including—but certainly not limited to—Hans Morgenthau, John Mearsheimer, and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski. I have made this decision both unconsciously and consciously: 
unconsciously, as a product of American educational and professional institutions that 
expect a certain theoretical background of their students and practitioners; and consciously, 
as a means of examining the differences between the realist lens—which serves both the 
identitarian and practical purposes of Western states—and the theories and views of 
international relations popular in both Turkey and Russia. In this chapter, I will 
demonstrate that the self-perception of Turkey and Russia in regard to the pursuit of their 
interests in the Black and Caspian Sea may not negate the similar pursuits of the US and 
NATO either by diplomatic or military means. However, the development of a holistic 
strategy for engaging Turkey and Russia on either of these levels, as both the US and 
NATO strive to do, necessitates an understanding of how Turkish and Russian perceptions 
of self in relation to geography and geostrategic competitors shapes policy, military 
priority, and willingness to negotiate. 
 This analysis begins by utilizing the models of decision-making posited by 
Margaret and Charles Hermann and Graham Allison to determine the relevant actors in 
Turkish and Russian foreign policy and the philosophical ideas that guide these actors. This 
analysis recognizes that an actor’s capacity to make foreign policy decisions, and hence 
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the impact of the actor’s guiding philosophy, may face constraints of varying degree based 
on the strength of democratic and bureaucratic institutions. Subsequently, this chapter will 
examine more closely the philosophical underpinnings of the most relevant actors’ 
decisions regarding the Black and Caspian Seas, both in isolation from and in discourse 
with Western academics and policymakers. Based on this information, this chapter will 
provide insight on how Turkish and Russian self-perception and identity influence policy 
decisions with regard to the legal regimes and practical actions surrounding waterways 
shared between the two countries. 
 Ultimately, this chapter concludes that both Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan operate under philosophies that urge the creation of an outward-looking state with 
strong central leadership that can mitigate the influence of other powerful actors in the two 
leaders’ respective countries. Although the direct influences of specific actors such as 
Ahmet Davutoğlu and Aleksandr Dugin have waned, the ideologies of neo-Eurasianism 
and neo-Ottomanism have permeated both policy and academic spheres, and thus must be 
understood to make sense of the strategies that both countries will likely employ in 
negotiating foreign policy outcomes between themselves and Western allies. In this regard, 
both Turkey and Russia, which have seen a gradual shift toward authoritarianism in recent 
years and have both sought to distance themselves from the West, have a strong potential 
to become closer allies. However, the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits remain a historical 
battleground for Turkey and Russia, most notably after the Turkish Straits crisis from 1946-
1953, and Turkey’s interest in creating a gas corridor running from the Caspian states to 
Europe poses a challenge to Russia’s oil diplomacy. Thus, the legal regimes and politics 
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of waterways disputed between these two countries illuminate potential areas for the 
United States and its allies to encourage bilateral or multilateral cooperation for the 
preservation of present alliances and maintenance of global security. 
 
Determining Relevant Actors and Philosophies 
 
 Writing on the limits of realism in explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham 
Allison observes that “[t]here exists no pattern of activity for which an imaginative analyst 
cannot write a large number of objective functions such that the pattern of activity 
maximizes each function.”93 In this regard, the rationality-based neorealist school of 
international politics theory—or even predictive foreign policy theory, as Colin Elman 
suggests (though seminal neorealist Kenneth Waltz would disagree)—relies greatly on 
hindsight and reductionism, a claim which Elman acknowledges but which falls beyond 
the scope of his argument.94 As a substitute to the rationality model, Graham Allison 
proposes two differing models: the organizational process model and the governmental 
politics model, both of which acknowledge the role of a state’s unique political structures 
and the role that influential individuals can play in shaping foreign policy. To use the 
United States as an example, the actions potentially undertaken by an actor are constrained 
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in the first model by a parliamentary process such as the Congress, and in the second model 
by the interests of powerful actors such as lobbying groups. 
 Margaret and Charles Hermann take this approach one step further, arguing that 
depending on the foreign policy issue or level of severity, a country’s political system may 
rely on different power actors to resolve the issue, whether a predominant leader, a single 
group, or multiple autonomous actors.95 Additionally, two or more of these power 
structures may be present at a time, such as a predominant leader who acts under the 
influence or counsel of autonomous actors. Determining the applicability of each of these 
models necessitates an understanding of the extent to which elected bodies or special power 
interests can wield power in a country.96 The subsequent sections will aim to answer this 
question by considering the historical development of power structures within Turkey and 
Russia and the efforts of both Erdoğan and Putin to consolidate power and transform their 
respective countries on an institutional level. 
 
Turkey’s Authoritarian Backslide and Presidential Transformation 
 In a 2003 paper presented at the American Political Science Association’s 
conference, Murat and Umut Özkaleli examine the nature of Turkish democracy to evaluate 
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its applicability as a model for democratization in the Muslim world. The Turkish model 
has a constitution that maintains the republic’s secular nature and acknowledges the 
military’s role in preserving Turkish democracy.97 Almost unique within the Muslim 
world, Turkey managed to preserve a democratic government for much of its modern 
existence, including a multi-party electoral system in which participants, despite 
ideological differences, generally support the creation and maintenance of a secular, 
nationalist state.98 Yet Özkaleli and Özkaleli suggest likewise that Turkish democracy as a 
model may be more hegemonic than institutional, particularly looking at the case of 
Pakistan, which sought mostly to implement the military characteristics of this system. 
Indeed, the role of the Turkish military in carrying out open coups amid periods of 
widespread civil unrest in 1960, 1971 and 1980, and a soft power coup in 1997, speaks to 
the fragile nature of Turkish democracy at the time of Özkaleli and Özkaleli’s writing.99 
 13 years after this article’s publication, on July 15, 2016, the Turkish military would 
attempt another coup against current leader Erdoğan, whose presidency was controversial 
in military circles due to the political Islamism of his Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
and his repression of civil liberties. But this time, Erdoğan remained in power, thanks 
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largely to his successful mobilization of Turkish citizens to stand against the military and 
the failure of the army faction to secure either strong public or broader military support.100 
Since the time of the coup, in addition to firing high-ranking university professors and 
cracking down on dissent, the Erdoğan administration has taken steps to eliminate the 
military’s role in the Turkish government. The state of emergency declared after the 
military coup lasted through the early months of 2017, even during Erdoğan’s 
constitutional referendum. 
The referendum put to vote in April 2017 most notoriously sought to change 
Turkey’s democracy from a parliamentary system to a presidential one, abolishing the 
position of Prime Minister and granting Erdoğan more power as both Head of State and 
Government, with the capacity to issue executive decrees to be enshrined in law by 
Parliament. However, many of the articles in this referendum also deal with the power of 
the military and can be read as an attempt to decrease military influence in the aftermath 
of the July 15 military coup attempt. Article 76 of the new Turkish constitution renders 
Turkish citizens with ties to the military ineligible for Parliamentary candidacy, while 
article 142 would abolish military courts except in time of war.101 This latter change was 
annulled by the Constitutional Commission, alongside changes to the president’s powers 
to appoint bureaucratic officials and “reserve MPs,” but the message sent to the military in 
                                                 
100 BBC News, “Turkey’s coup attempt: What you need to know,” July 17, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36816045  
101 Turkish Bar Union, “Anayasa Değişikliği Teklifi’nin Karşılaştırmalı ve Açıklamalı Metni” (Text of 




the referendum language remains clear.102 This referendum passed, albeit by a slim margin, 
to the chagrin of international observers and democracy-promoting organizations. By 2017 
Turkey’s Freedom House score had already been on a steady decline due largely to 
crackdowns on civil liberties and assaults on the press,103 but the Polity IV index, which 
historically graded Turkish democracy more favorably, drastically downgraded Turkey 
from a democracy (with a score of 9) to an open anocracy in 2014 (3) and then to a closed 
anocracy in 2016 (-4).104 
 Hence, since the July 15 military coup the Erdoğan administration has moved to 
consolidate power in the executive and the Parliament, at the expense of the military, and 
with the President as head of both government and state. Erdoğan has therefore emerged 
as the primary power actor in Turkey, and thus this paper will focus primarily on analyzing 
the political and identitarian philosophies of Erdoğan in order to determine how they shape 
foreign policy. However, although the failure of the July 15 coup attempt and subsequent 
barring of military officials from serving in Parliament constitutes an attempt to undermine 
military influence, one should not assume that the Turkish military has disappeared as a 
force in Turkish politics. This coup attempt failed not only because of Erdoğan’s popularity 
among the Turkish public, but also because of the failure of the rebelling military faction 
to garner wider support among the military. Whether or not that support will materialize in 
future years may remain to be seen. 
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Erdoğan, Davutoğlu, and Neo-Ottomanism 
 
 With Ahmet Davutoğlu ousted from his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
2016, one may be tempted to imagine that the influence of his neo-Ottoman worldview of 
foreign policy has dwindled. Yet several occurrences within the Erdoğan presidency, as 
well as the overall Islamist bent of Erdoğan’s AKP, indicate that the influence of 
Davutoğlu’s Strategic Depth doctrine and foreign policy theory, especially as a response 
to the foreign policy of previous leaders, remains alive and well. Davutoğlu’s critiques of 
the military as guardian of Turkish democracy are echoed in the recent anti-military steps 
taken by Erdoğan in the wake of the failed coup, and Erdoğan’s tendency to lash out against 
European world leaders—including accusing Dutch leaders of being “Nazi remnants”—
reaffirms the opposition to universalized globalization posited by Davutoğlu.105 In order to 
understand the impact of Davutoğlu on foreign policy, one must first understand how his 
philosophy of international relations arose in a wider Turkish context. 
 Alexander Murinson defines Turkish foreign policy as being influenced by five 
main sources: the Ottoman experience of balance of power (as evidenced in Chapter 1); 
the Kemalist doctrine of isolationism; the drive for European modernization; Turkish 
suspicion of foreign powers (which coincides with the balance of power experience); and 
the rise of pan-Turkism.106 For much of its history, the Republic of Turkey followed a 
Kemalist logic of secular nationalism guarded by the military, even sustaining several 
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military coups, as noted in the previous section. However, since the end of the Cold War, 
Turkish foreign policy underwent a paradigm shift that Murinson describes as outward-
looking and largely applying domestic policy (particularly with regard to the PKK) to the 
foreign policy arena. This foreign policy, conceived as distinct from Kemalism and put into 
practice by Turgut Özal’s administration, became known as neo-Ottomanism.107 
 Contemporary columnist Cengiz Candar described Özal’s neo-Ottomanism as “an 
intellectual movement that advocated Turkish pursuit of active and diversified foreign 
policy in the region based on the Ottoman historical heritage. The neo-Ottomans 
envisioned Turkey as a leader of Muslim and Turkic worlds and a central power in 
Eurasia.”108 Murinson observes common themes between this foreign policy doctrine and 
Thatcherism, while also noting the Özal administration’s increased questioning of the 
military’s role in government, a trend continued by the Erdoğan administration. However, 
while this period saw the genesis of neo-Ottoman thought, the role of this philosophy in 
foreign policy would be further consolidated by Erdoğan and his close advisor, then Dr. 
Ahmet Davutoğlu. 
 Davutoğlu’s strategic depth doctrine, which rose to prominence thanks largely to 
his 2001 book of the same name, began to form in his 1998 article “The Clash of Interests: 
An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order.”109 In this article, Davutoğlu critiques Samuel 
Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theory and Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” 
theory, calling for a re-assessment of the US’ foreign policy role and an establishment of 






“inter-civilizational dialogue” as opposed to the “clash” proposed by Huntington. 
According to this paradigm, Turkey—as a Republic and the successor state to the Ottoman 
Empire—is a culture, geography and civilization separate from the West that cannot be 
defined by the same international relations paradigms and worldviews. For example, the 
concept of offshore balancing developed by Mearsheimer works well for a country isolated 
from the rest of the world by two large oceans, like the United States, but is less applicable 
to a land-based power such as Turkey. 
 Davutoğlu’s body of work offers an equal measure of critiques against Turkey’s 
relationship with NATO and the potentially destabilizing “virulent nationalism” of Russia, 
and instead calls on Turkey to adopt Islam and Islamism as a means of projecting Turkish 
soft power, particularly after the collapse of Soviet-style atheist authoritarianism. 
However, rather than recommend a severance of ties with either side, Davutoğlu frames 
the discourse in terms of caution and “strategic parameters,” echoing the Ottoman-era 
balance of power that governed Turkish foreign policy with regard to the Turkish Straits. 
Indeed, the Turkish Straits play a particularly important role for Davutoğlu, who views 
them as one of Turkey’s “chokepoints” and a vital territory in Turkey’s horizontal (North-
South) geographic orientation, linking the Balkans and the Caucasus to the geoeconomic 
resource centers of the Caspian and the Middle East.110 This emphasis on the Straits, 
combined with the Erdoğan administration’s distrust of foreign powers in the Straits as 
enumerated in Chapter 1, indicates that the US should consider Turkish skepticism of 
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NATO involvement in the Black Sea within the context of balance of power between 
Western powers and Russia. 
 For a more complex example of Erdoğan’s relationship with the strategic depth 
doctrine, one can look at his efforts to engage more actively in Central Asia, the location 
of three Turkic Caspian littoral states—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan—and, 
historically, a region falling squarely within Russia’s sphere of influence. While Davutoğlu 
has criticized the pan-Turkist philosophy of former Turkish Presidents Turgut Özal and 
Süleyman Demirel for lacking strategic depth, Central Asian countries remained among 
Turkey’s most important trading partners, as well as members in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) and the Organization for Islamic Cooperation. Initially, the Erdoğan 
administration attempted to spread Turkish soft power throughout the region by way of 
establishing Islamist schools associated with Fethullah Gülen’s Hizmet movement, 
established after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Certainly this strategy coincides more 
with the pan-Islamist interpretation of Davutoğlu than with the pan-Turkism of Özal. 
Yet after the December 2013 corruption scandal in Turkey, a rift began to form 
between Erdoğan and Gülen, with the former accusing the latter of attempting to create a 
parallel state and even accusing Gülen of masterminding the July 15 coup attempt from a 
position of exile in Pennsylvania. This parallel state rhetoric has been subsequently adopted 
by Turkish allies in Central Asia such as Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which, 
together with Uzbekistan’s earlier action in 1999, closed down schools associated with the 
Gülenist movement at the urging of the Turkish government between 2014 and 2015.111 
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As reports from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs show, Turkey’s contemporaneous 
decision to slash trade volumes with Central Asian countries from 2014-2015 indicates 
Erdoğan’s active concern for exerting influence over these countries, including three of the 
Caspian littoral states.112 With Gülenism out of the picture in these countries, with Central 
Asian states increasingly concerned about Islamic extremism, and with the growing role of 
China and potentially the SCO in regional politics, a resurgence in pan-Turkist foreign 
policy may yet remain possible.  
 As Marlene Laruelle suggests, however, the possibility for a resurgence in pan-
Turkism remains mitigated by the “Anatolian” nationalism posited by Atatürk after the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which sought more to Turkicize minority groups than 
form alliances with other Turkic peoples. The rapprochement between Turkey and the 
Soviet Union further mitigated the pan-Turkic phenomenon, and even after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Özal’s pan-Turkic ambitions began to dissipate as the newly formed 
Russian state began reasserting its influence in the region.113 Hence, there exists a 
correlation between the proximity of Turkish-Russian relations and the prominence of 
Anatolian Turkish nationalism (which Laruelle dubs a “realist” form of nationalism) at the 
expense of Turanian (pan-Turkic) nationalism. 
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This correlation highlights one of the limits of realist analysis for the purposes of 
US foreign policymaking: where realism prevails, Turkey and Russia draw closer, which 
means a potential loss of US and Western influence as Erdoğan and Putin take bolder, more 
critical stances against the Western emphasis on human rights in foreign policy. The 
development of pipelines and trade routes in the Caspian Sea, from which Turkey stands 
to benefit as a transit hub, and the continuation of military cooperation with Turkey in the 
Black Sea can serve as a means of reinforcing the alliance between Turkey and the US. 
CSIS analyst Boris Toucas observes that Turkey will likely attempt to balance the power 
of the US and Russia regardless of short-term developments, meaning that additional 
allocation of funds to military cooperation may yield diminishing returns.114 However, 
continued rhetorical, technical, and military support on the part of US leaders for Turkey’s 
territorial integrity in the Black Sea, the long-standing legal regime of the Montreux 
Convention, and the establishment of trade corridors to supply energy to Europe may assist 
the US in maintaining soft power in the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
 
Vladimir Putin and Russia’s Post-Soviet Identity 
 
 If the Erdoğan presidency has been marked by attempts to consolidate state and 
executive power at the expense of military influence, then Vladimir Putin, as president of 
Russia, has sought to consolidate this same power at the expense of the oligarchs who came 
                                                 




to power under Yeltsin. Ken Jowitt frames much of the first two terms of Putin’s presidency 
as his attempt to distance himself from his predecessor “attempting to articulate and 
consolidate a new Russian political identity, not simply enhance and stabilize Russia’s state 
power.”115 To this end, Jowitt observes, Putin’s administration has implanted the 
“consolidation imperatives” of distance and difference from existing identities (such as 
Yeltsin’s openness to Western corporate interests), dominance over subversive identities 
in times of strength, and defiance in times of disenfranchisement. For Jowitt, the vertical 
integration of Russia’s power structure at the expense of oligarchs and regional leaders, as 
well as the vulgar, abrasive language used by Putin and his supporters, serves as a means 
of achieving the primary imperatives of distance and difference in order to lay the 
framework for a new ideology of state. 
 To understand Putin’s attempts to distance himself from Yeltsin, we must first 
understand the context from which the desire to drift further away from Yeltsin arose. After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin inherited a Russia beset by a power vacuum, 
leading to what Vladimir Shlapentokh and several later scholars would dub the “feudal 
model” of Yeltsin-era Russia. Despite Yeltsin’s efforts to make Russia more like the 
victorious Western powers, under this model Russia became “a society plagued by 
extensive ‘privatization’ of public power, extreme regionalism, and ‘unbearable weakness 
of the state.’”116 In this time, groups of Russian oligarchs managed to seize control of 
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industries previously owned by the state, essentially creating monopolies that led to 
massive inequalities in the new Russian society. 
 Jowitt argues that the primary goal of Vladimir Putin’s first years in office was to 
replace the weak feudal state of Yeltsin with a “mercantilist state-nation” in which the state 
would serve as a strong force for national identity, as opposed to the nation-states typical 
of the post-Westphalian international system and the regionalism that beset the Yeltsin era. 
Putin and his advisors and allies also distance and differentiate themselves from the Yeltsin 
era by rejecting imitation of the West, and indeed speaking highly critically of Western 
human rights imperatives as a pretension for broader strategic goals. Putin thus has a goal 
of making the West “increasingly irrelevant” in Russia’s sphere of influence.117 Rather 
than allowing sectarian, ethnic, and ideological groups to vie for influence, Putin has 
employed a political strategy of co-opting members of both the far left and the far right 
under a larger banner, taking advantage of cynicism and postmodern attitudes among the 
Russian population to create a political tent as large as possible.118 
 As a replacement for the Yeltsin-era oligarchs, a clan of military and intelligence 
elites known as the siloviki began to emerge under Putin. Cappelli defines this clan as being 
comprised of “people with military-security background, including army and intelligence 
personnel, leading officials of the law enforcement and power ministries, and managers 
from the military-industrial complex.”119 The creation of this clan, centralized in the power 
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center of Moscow, aids in the task of restoring center-periphery relations (under the 
aforementioned paradigm of vertical integration) and establishing what Putin and his 
advisors refer to as a “managed democracy.” Given this state- and military-centric 
approach to governance, as well as Russia’s backslide into open anocracy (if not 
authoritarianism) and Putin’s rejection of Western imitation in favor of reasserting a 
distinctly Russian sphere of influence, this chapter will analyze the political philosophies 
of Putin and the siloviki to assess the likely actions of Russia with regard to maritime 
policy. 
 
Putin and Neo-Eurasianism 
 
 The recent increase in Russian belligerency in the Crimea and Syria indicates that 
much like Erdoğan and Davutoğlu’s Turkey, Putin’s Russia has come to define its borders 
by looking outward to former territories and spheres of influence. Together with Jowitt’s 
metaphor of Moscow as a “castle” city, Edith Clowes observes a tendency of Russian 
literature to bemoan Moscow’s status as an isolated city failing to live up to the mantle of 
the Third Rome.120 Clowes also observes the tendency of Russian literary minds to 
understand national identity and culture in terms of space rather than time. Hence, Russian 
writers engage in discourse of the “center” and the “periphery,” with figures such as V.O. 
Klyuchevsky lamenting that “[i]n Russia the center is on the periphery.”121 Although this 
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spatial understanding of Russian identity contrasts with the time-based “radiant future” 
discourse of the Soviet era, the spatial identity hearkens back to the wide, expansive 
geography of the Soviet Union and its former satellites. To this end, Oleg Ilnytski asks the 
question of “what is Russia without Ukraine”—a question made all the more relevant in 
the years after Clowes’ book—and Putin refers to the Soviet Union’s collapse as the 
“greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century,” lamenting that many Russians 
found themselves beyond the Russian border.122 
 Here it is important to note Putin’s choice of language in defining who is Russian—
he uses the juridical term rossiiski rather than the ethnic russki. This term connotes a state- 
and polity-based understanding of identity rather than the ethnic one characterizing the 
post-Westphalian nation-state system that “does not fit the Russian historical experience,” 
and aligns more with the “state-nation” concept posited by Hill et al.123 Here we see that a 
strong, Machiavellian, vertically integrated state—which Olga Kryshtanovskaya 
characterizes as an “age-old Russian political tradition”—serves as a marker for a new 
Russian identity.124 Viewed in this context, nostalgia for the expansive political power of 
the Soviet Union, laments of a Russia without Ukraine or the Crimea, and the desire to lift 
Moscow from its periphery status to the rightful mantle of “third Rome” all serve the view 
of Russia as a “state-nation” defined by civic belonging rather than ethnicity. Therefore, 
foreign policy—generally the domain of a strong, federal state rather than local political 
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entities—plays a crucial role in defining Russia as a “state-nation” rather than a 
confederation of diverse ethnic groups and local interests. 
 Any discussion of post-USSR Russian identity and must inevitably address the 
public intellectual figure that Clowes calls “the main straw man in the debate”: namely, the 
far-right ideologue Aleksandr Dugin.125 Although academics such as Clowes and Laruelle 
acknowledge Dugin as a prolific writer who has exerted some influence over foreign policy 
as the geopolitics chair for the Duma’s National Security Council, the veracity of Dugin’s 
claims that he is a “shadow counsellor” to the Putin administration remains difficult to 
verify.126 Even other Eurasianists such as Aleksandr Panarin and Edvard Bagramov 
violently reject the strain of Eurasianism posited by Dugin, who was removed as Moscow 
State University’s Head of the Department of Sociology of International Relations in 2014 
after expressing support for the commission of war crimes against Ukraine.127 Clowes 
delineates the many ways in which Dugin differentiates himself from these other 
Eurasianists, calling attention to the irony that “Eurasia has virtually no voices in Dugin’s 
world, while the mythic villains of the West have many varied voices,” including the New 
Right of France and the “heartland-rimland” distinction of English geostrategist Sir Halford 
Mackinder.128 Dugin also imagines a Eurasia based on “Iranian-Turkic-Slavic bonding” 
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and views the Russian ethnos as the progenitor of Turanism.129 Whatever the historical 
merits of this view, and notwithstanding Dugin’s rejection of the Western positivist view 
of history, the previous section on Davutoğlu and neo-Ottomanism indicates that a Russian 
attempt to establish itself as the standard bearer for pan-Turanism could create significant 
friction in Turkish-Russian relations. Given the current state of Turkish-Russian relations 
and the continuation of Southern Gas Corridor development with the Turkic Caspian states, 
one may question the extent to which Putin is adhering (or has managed to adhere) to this 
philosophy insofar as it pertains to Turkey. 
Yet while the direct influence of Dugin himself may be called into question, there 
remains an ample body of evidence pointing to Eurasianism’s academic influence on the 
Kremlin and Russian foreign policy. Laruelle notes Putin’s explicit overtures to Eurasian 
thinkers in the past, including invoking one of the philosophy’s most seminal progenitors, 
Turkic world scholar Lev Gumilev, in his speeches.130 Neo-Eurasianist scholars, many of 
whom contend that Russia must embrace Islam in order to maintain its sphere of influence, 
likewise praise Putin’s decision to join Islamic conferences and promote the “Asian-ness” 
of Russia.131 Whether this phenomenon indicates Putin’s affinity for Eurasianism remains 
open for debate; Pomerantsev reminds us that Putin has sought to build a wide coalition 
under the banner of his United Russia party.132 In the context of Putin’s speeches to parts 
of Central Asia such as Tatarstan and Kazakhstan, the latter of which has seen a revitalized 
                                                 
129 Ibid, 51 
130 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, 10 
131 Ibid, 7; Laruelle, Alexandre Dugin, 90 
132 Pomerantsev, “The Hidden Author of Putinism” 
69 
 
interest in Eurasianism in recent years, this appeal to Gumilev’s work may also be seen 
more as an act of smart diplomacy. However, the presence of Eurasianism in the public 
discourse suggests a significant level of public and academic impact, and Putin’s use of 
this rhetoric in the “near abroad” signifies a recognition of its value as a diplomatic tool for 
maintaining Russia’s sphere of influence. 
 Eurasianism also plays a central role in answering the question of whether Russia 
is a Western country, a Slavic country, or even one influenced by the Mongolic hordes. 
Leah Greenfeld framed the discourse on Russian identity in the 19th century in terms of 
Russia’s ressentiment towards the West, a mixture of envy and hatred formed in response 
to the reforms of Peter the Great and responsible for the divide between Westernizers and 
Slavophiles.133 In a sense, Eurasianism offered an alternative to this dichotomy. Although 
contemporary thinkers such as Vladimir Solovyov feared that an Asian identity would 
nurture a barbaric “pan-Mongolism,” Eurasianists began to argue for a Russian identity 
capable of including Asian peoples, albeit under a Christian or “Aryan” banner.134 The 
Soviet Union outlawed and condemned Eurasianism as a bourgeois philosophy, but the 
work of neo-Eurasianists such as Lev Gumilev—a 20th century Turkic world scholar—
gave rise to the Pamyat movement in the 80s and the publication of numerous Eurasianist 
journals, magazines and newspapers.135 For these scholars, Eurasianism betrays a Russian 
tendency toward synthesis between East and West, a distinctly Hegelian idea that further 
calls into question the specific influence of Dugin. 
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 Laruelle attributes to this new wave of scholars a reframing of Russia’s relationship 
with the West and its status as an empire through the lens of Central Asia.136 Aleksandr 
Panarin, for instance, conceives of a Russian empire that embodies “moral statehood,” 
recognizes national diversity and rejects nationalism in favor of religiosity, an idea 
consistent with the concept of state-nation advanced by Putin. Edvard Bagramov likewise 
draws on the rhetoric of Gumilev to invite increased cooperation between Slavs and Turks. 
Despite this bold stance, many of these Eurasianists tend to characterize themselves as 
pragmatic and apolitical, a characterization often applied to Putin himself. In addition to 
these evident parallels with Putinism and Putin’s rhetoric, Laruelle indicates that these 
brands of Eurasianism have permeated both academia and the military-industrial complex, 
indicating significant influence over Putin’s military elites (the siloviki) and thus the 
decision-making process as a whole.137 
 Thus we see an outward-looking, activist foreign policy not merely as a means of 
advancing Russian hegemony and interests but as a central pillar of a new Russian state-
nation identity largely intertwined with its status as a former empire and controller of 
territory in Central Asia. The world has recently witnessed the effects of this outward-
looking foreign policy in Ukraine and the Crimea, the invasion of which puts Russia in a 
stronger military position in the Black Sea and, from NATO’s perspective, reinforces the 
necessity of supporting Turkey to maintain a power balance and deter further incursions or 
even a repeat of the 1946 Turkish Straits crisis. Moreover, a Russian identity guided by 
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Eurasianism has resisted and continues to resist the development of Western interests and 
hegemony in the Caspian basin, including the development of the oil pipelines and transit 
corridors which Russia has threatened to attack, as outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The 
integration of disparate ethnic identities within Russian territory into a unified state-nation 
likewise necessitates efforts to mitigate the rise of Islamist insurgency in Chechnya, 
Dagestan, and similar disputed Eurasian territories. Clowes shows that this anxiety about 
the Muslim Caucasus, which she calls the “geographical blind spot of Russia’s new rulers,” 
has led to public dialogue suppression, media redevelopment, and the return of the Russian 
secret police force. Here the possibility for anti-terrorism cooperation with Turkey, a nation 
perpetually anxious about the Kurdish question, becomes relevant as well. 
 
Conclusions and Limitations 
 
 As Graham Allison reminds us, the construction of value-maximizing accounts of 
past developments benefits greatly from hindsight and necessitates background 
information on history and identity in order to predict how states will act in the future based 
on their established foreign policy priorities. This chapter has aimed to outline the foreign 
policy priorities of both Russia and Turkey based on the philosophies guiding each 
country’s decision makers. Littoral conflict and cooperation between Turkey and Russia in 
the Black and Caspian betrays more than simply a rational, realist engagement in 
geopolitics: both states’ actions are guided by their experience as empires and states subject 
to the designs of other empires. In Turkey, this experience translates into efforts to balance 
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power between NATO and Russia in order to avoid one side wielding disproportionate 
influence, as well as a rising current of pan-Turkism buoyed by Turkey’s economic 
interests as a transit hub between Europe and the Turkic Caspian states. Meanwhile, 
Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine and attempts to project power and influence in Central 
Asia, though perhaps less effectively as of late, indicate an attempt to revitalize Russia’s 
status as a central player in world politics via an outward-looking, activist foreign policy. 
The discrepancies between the goals of these two states highlight the potential for 
cooperation with NATO ally Turkey in order to maintain strong relations and avoid a loss 
of soft power to Russia. 
 Some authors such as Jowitt have attempted to push back against the narrative 
common in Western scholarly and popular literature that Russia is inherently an imperialist 
power, arguing that Putin mainly views war as an instrument of resisting NATO incursion 
on Russian sovereignty.138 While the recent events in Ukraine necessitate some degree of 
caution and skepticism with regard to Russian foreign policy, the clash of insurgents in the 
Muslim Caucasus with Russian state-nation identity provides an example of instances 
where either anti-terrorism cooperation may be encouraged or used as a negotiating chip, 
or the US and its allies might encourage conflict in a similar vein to Russian support for 
Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
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 As Erdogan’s Turkey moves closer to Russia both in terms of political autocracy 
and rhetorical opposition to Western and European human rights concerns, an evaluation 
of the ideal strategy for maintaining strong relations with Turkey and promoting American 
interests in the West necessitates a re-evaluation of our political philosophy and priorities 
in the region. What the US and Western scholars term “realism” prevails in Turkish-
Russian relations when Turkey’s leadership espouses an Anatolian nationalism that rejects 
pan-Turanian idealism in favor of maintaining strong relations with Russia, a situation 
currently borne out in the growing rapprochement between Russia and Turkey despite 
numerous incidents. As both countries experience backslides on democracy and critique 
Western meddling in their domestic affairs, their leaders become natural allies whose 
regimes depend on strong nationalist and militarist leadership and the pursuit of self-
definition in relation to Europe. Thus, the application of a pure realist lens to US 
involvement in Turkish-Russian relations ends inevitably with the loss of US soft power 
as the mutual interests of Turkey and Russia, who also benefit mutually from a high trade 
volume, draw the two countries closer together. The national identities of Turkey and 
Russia, informed by the imperial history of both countries and the Presidential and military 
power structures developed therein, can inform Western analysts in turn of the potential 




 Historically, contestation over the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits has posed one 
of the greatest roadblocks to Turkish-Russian relations, whether imperial or present-day. 
The historical experience of Russia aiming to annex the Turkish Straits, whether under the 
rules of Peter and Catherine the Great in the 17th and 18th centuries or under Stalin after 
World War II, makes the Straits system one of the region’s critical “chokepoints,” in Ahmet 
Davutoglu’s parlance. This area also remains one of the most crucial regions of military 
cooperation for NATO, a cooperation promoted by Ankara as a means of mitigating 
Russia’s influence over the Straits system. Indeed, as Russia continues the naval buildup 
in the Black Sea undertaken after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the capacity of Turkey 
to continue its defense of the Turkish Straits in accordance with the 1936 Montreux 
Convention may rely on the intervention of its allies, including NATO. Boris Toucas 
contends that Turkey views NATO with increasing suspicion and faces Russian pressure 
to keep non-regional actors out of the Black Sea. However, as shown in Chapter 3 and 
likewise observed by Toucas, the neo-Ottoman philosophy undergirding the Erdogan 
administration’s decision-making process will likely lead to pursuit of power balance in 
the region as was the case in the 19th century, leaving a window for NATO and US 
involvement and cooperation open.139 
 Meanwhile, Turkey’s involvement in the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan provides 
the country with an opportunity to continue transforming itself into an important gas hub 
for Western countries, which could provoke a severe backlash in Russia. Already the recent 
                                                 




rapprochement between Turkey and Russia has entailed the completion of the Blue Stream 
pipeline and the resumption of the TurkStream pipeline, to be completed in 2019. This 
emphasis, as well as Russian threats against the Turkmen Trans-Caspian Pipeline, 
demonstrate the relevance of these transit corridors to Russian interests and the potential 
of existing transit corridors to draw Turkey closer into the NATO orbit.140 A renewed 
Turkish interest in Central Asia and Turkic Caspian states in particular leaves open the 
possibility of increased friction with Russia, which has considered these states within its 
sphere of influence. Continued support for projects undertaken between Turkey and other 
Turkic Caspian states, whether energy-related or otherwise can serve as an avenue to 
maintain strong ties between Turkey and the West. Moreover, the rising prominence of 
China and the One Belt One Road project, while beyond the scope of this thesis, may alter 
the geopolitical layout of the Caspian region even further.  
 It should be noted that the primary objective of this thesis is to analyze the possible 
steps that the US government can take in response to the growing rapprochement between 
Turkey and Russia based on an analysis of the two countries’ naval and imperial histories 
and the development of their littoral legal regimes. The philosophical question of the extent 
to which the US should consider foreign policy involvement in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia a top priority remains highly relevant, especially considering President Trump’s 
rhetoric on whether allies are paying their fair share and critiques of opposition figures 
such as Bernie Sanders over US involvement in the Saudi-led proxy war in Yemen.141 
                                                 
140 Ibid. 
141 Although toned down from Trump’s campaign trail rhetoric, an allusion to the question of whether US 
allies are paying their fair share militarily can be found in the Trump Administration’s National Security 
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Certainly the current administration remains friendly to military interests and, backed even 
by Democrats in the Senate, has pushed for an increase in military spending to $716 billion 
per year.142 However, to whatever extent one considers this status quo desirable, the 
potential for subsequent administrations to reduce the military budget remains present and 
must be accounted for in any responsible military strategy. 
 Bearing this in mind, in making recommendations on potential military and 
diplomatic actions to take with regard to Turkish-Russian relations, this analysis has sought 
to qualify its recommendations with the caveat that smarter spending, as opposed to more 
spending, will be the ideal solution. Turkey, a country whose foreign policy has been 
shaped by the experience of Ottoman power balancing and attempts by European powers 
to gain control or influence over the Turkish Straits, is likely to view US and NATO 
interests in the Black and Caspian Seas with as much suspicion as Russian interests. 
Actions such as the Turkish purchase of a Russian missile defense system in 2017 may 
necessitate similar increases in material military support, but neo-Ottoman skepticism of 
foreign powers will lead to diminishing returns for expensive military gestures.143 
Renewals of present rhetorical commitments to support for Turkey in the Black and 
Caspian Seas may prove more efficient in the long run. 
                                                 
Strategy, released December 2017 and available at the White House website. Sanders’ rhetoric on US-
support for the Saudi-led bombing of Yemen can be seen in the Sanders Statement on Yemen Resolution 
Vote on March 20, 2018, which can be found on Sanders’ official website. 
142 Mike Eckel, “Trump Signs $700 Billion Military Budget Into Law, Urges Congress To Fund It,” Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 12, 2017. 




 The rise of Donald Trump, the emboldening of Erdoğan after the April 2017 
referendum, and the cynical vulgarity of Putin have all contributed to a media culture of 
extreme rhetoric in recent years, which on the surface threatens to unravel the alliances 
formed during and after the Cold War. Yet behind the aggressive posturing of today’s 
world leaders, the foreign policymaking process in Turkey and Russia remains largely 
guided by the same geopolitical calculus employed over the past 20 years. Even the Trump 
administration has not departed radically from previous administrations, largely due to the 
bureaucratic decision-making structure and constitutional checks on Presidential power in 
the US, though whether Trump’s recent replacements of Rex Tillerson as Secretary of State 
and Henry McMaster as National Security Advisor will alter this paradigm remains to be 
seen.144 A responsible strategy for engaging Turkey, Russia, and the broader Caucasus and 
Central Asia region necessitates an ability to see past inflamed rhetoric and understand the 
historical and geopolitical dynamics that inform foreign policy and decision making. As 
much of an upheaval as the recent Turkish-Russian rapprochement and Turkish distancing 
from Europe may appear on the surface, the core dynamics of the region remain largely 
unchanged, and avenues remain wide open for the US to maintain and expand its soft power 
into the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
                                                 
144 In the journalistic world, Jonathan Marcus demonstrates the similarities of Trump’s national security 
strategy with that of past administrations in his December 18, 2017 BBC News article “Trump’s National 
Security Strategy: A pragmatic view of troubled world.” One can likewise confirm this claim by analyzing 
the strategy itself and the ways in which it lines up with current American policies. Though Trump’s 
policies on free trade align with the “America First” doctrine and rejection of transnational citizenship 
outlined in this document, his declared aversion to nation-building efforts such as the Iraq War clashes with 
continued American engagement in the bombing campaigns begun by Obama, with bipartisan support, in 
Syria and Yemen. Other Trump policies are distinct from Obama’s but have precedent among 
neoconservative voices in Congress, such as a rhetorical (if yet unrealized) commitment to repealing the 
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